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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS


Background


The National Aeronautics and Space Administration under a continuous


management improvement program for loss control directed Weiner Associates,


Inc., under Contract NASW-2903, to examine the overall spectrum of safety


and health accident/injury data presently in existence from three of its


centers, GSFC, LRC and Headquarters, which were thought to be representative


of the agency as a whole.


Objectives


The overall objective of this work was to analyze NASA's accident and


injury history at these centers and to advise NASA on ways and means to


upgrade its current loss control program to reduce, if possible, its


personnel injury, accident rates and associated losses of equipment or


facilities.


Conclusions


This study indicates that at Goddard Space Flight Center, Langley -

Research Center and Headquarters, safety programs are working well and that


while the severity of lost-time injuries has increased at these centers,


it has dropped over 50% for all of NASA in the last four years. GSFC


and LRC severity levels are now of the same magnitude as that for all of


NASA. In addition, non-aircraft/mission property damage of the type A & B


class at these centers is well under control and those accidents of this


type that do occur are the result of failure of supervisors to recognize


significant hazardous situations. Type "I" incidents are not a major loss


factor but are a major function of the level of prototype R&D carried out


at each center. The rise in accident frequency seen at these centers


during the last several years is not indicative of a failure of safety


programs or a real increase in accidents, but rather the result of a


change in the manner of evaluating and reporting accidents imposed by a


change over from Z16.1 to OSHA formats. NASA administration of safety


-programs at the centers studied is in full compliance with the requirements


of .the 1970 Occupational Safety and Health Act and--ExecUtive Order 11807.


NASA, in comparison to other large R&D oriented government and non­
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government facilities shows similar trends in accident frequency and


severity. Inaddition, the absolute value of the histograms of these


parameters is directly comparable to similar government and non-govern­

ment organizations over the last five years. NASA in comparison to


all government and industry has significantly lower frequency and severity,


rates and the trends of increase in occupation injury frequency are


the result of the general momentum of government increases due to reporting


format changes.


The major controllable NASA losses are tied to occupational injury


lost-time and property damage due to fire. Although losses due to


personal injury are declining, the Continuation of Pay program at


NASA is a significant source of loss due to employee abuse and must


be remodled and administered by each center to discourage such abuse.


NASA employees average about two times as much lost-time per-accident


over the five most prevalent categories of injury as NASA support


contractor personnel, although contractor personnel are exposed to the


same or greater work environment risks. For those categories of injury


which have the largest frequency of occurrence (back/legs/foot/ankle)


and, hence, the highest statistical base, NASA employees average from


62% to 210% more lost-time per similar body part injured. These same


categories of injury are associated with the type of body damage that


depends a great deal on the patient's personal judgment rather than


a strict medical judgment as to the time the patient iswell enough


to return to work.


All non-aircraft and non-mission failure fires of the type A &_B


at the NASA centers studied in this work, showed the same basic cause


profile. They were fires involving large pieces of equipment or buildings


that had no fire detection alarms or protection systems or if they


did, these systems-were inoperable at the time of the fire. This type of


'fire is caused by non-NASA workmen involved in minor repair work without


the benefit of effective portable standby firefighting equipment, no


fire prevention training and apparently ignorant of the potential


disaster their work could cause.


Type"I" fires represent an extremely small element of NASA's


total loss picture. Most of the type "I"fires at the facilities studied


are by-products of the nature of the NASA center's basic business. Many
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of them are electrical in nature based on short circuits in facility


lighting fixtures or in experimental bread-board type equipment that has not


reached final design stages where fault-protection systems are naturally


added. A second category of small fires is induced by equipment that has


been overloaded or is aging. This is also a natural event in an R&D


environment where equipment is exposed to unusual conditions that may tax


design or to advanced aging from both environmental and extended cost-benefit


exposure.


Very encouraging, however, is the observation that NASA Type "I"


fires at the centers studied in this report have been well controlled by


fire protection programs now in existence. Overall loss to NASA has been


kept below $170.00 per average incident. Therefore, this type of fire


is the natural noise level incident associated with the nature of NASA's


basic R&D function or random mistakes in human judgment. Not much can


be effectively done to eliminate them but a lot can be done to keep their


magnitudes small by stringently adhering to present fire control and


safety practice and upgrading personnel training, detection equipment


and protection equipment with the latest technology.


The lack of any property losses from chemical explosions and pressure


vessel failures at the NASA centers studied is a very significant factor


in gauging the effectiveness of the Executive Safety Meeting technique


of planning and implementing in-house safety programs. This technique


should be expanded to those centers that do not now use it and an agency­

wide Executive Safety Meeting should be held at least annually to evaluate,


compare, implement and initiate overall NASA safety policy changes and


resources.


Auto accident property damage is not a significant element in.the


NASA loss control picture although several traffic fatalities have occurred


with NASA vehicles driven by contractor employees or involving civilians.


These fatalities could not have been prevented through any particular


safety policies or techniques.


Lost-time due to occupational injuries at all the NASA centers studied


showed that "Acts of God" represented 66% at LRC and 48% at GSFC of the
 

causal factors producing these injuries and that this type of incident


has increased markedly (at least by a factor of two) in the last 2 years.


Lost-time occupational injuries attributed to "Unsafe Acts" on the


part of the employee have dropped markedly at both GSFC and LRC in the


past two years and represent 44% and 28, respectively, of the total
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lost-time injury cause.


Lost-time occupational injuries attributed to "Unsafe Mechanical


or Electrical" conditions are quite low at all 
 centers studied and have


been relatively constant for the last five years. 
 At GSFC they represent


8% of the lost-time injuries and at LRC only 5.8%.


Therefore, the emphasis on reducing lost-time costs at the NASA


centers studied must be focused in the future on 
 those aspects of safety


training,psychology and employee morale that will help the employee


protect himself by recognizing potentially unsafe conditions and controlling


his own 
on-the-job awareness, his behavior, and his work environment


well enough to reduce human-failure type risks. Active recognition of


particular types of "Act of God" and "Unsafe Behavior" accidents common 
to each center by that center's Health and Safety Office personnel and


designing and implementing an 
effective training program for employees


on this type.of risk is a must for control of this type of loss.


Back injuries are the major cause of lost-time injury losses apparent


over the last five years at the NASA centers studied. Accidents associated


with an aging work force do not seem to be evident in the data reviewed


for this study. 
It is the younger blue-collar worker that contributes


most to lost-time. We found no relationship either statistical or causal


between non-lost time and lost time injuries in the data sample available


from LRC, GSFC or Headquarters. 
 NASA's excellent loss record in non-mission


failure industrial accidents can be attributed to the major technology and


management transfer from the "Systems Safety" area of the aerospace


"Mission Programs" directly into the OSHA area of facility operations,


Recommendations


1. Serious consideration should be given to an immediate study of the ad­

ministration of Continuation of Pay policies at all NASA centers and the


effects of Continuation of Pay abuse on total NASA lost-time costs should


be undertaken. The results of this work should be used to develop a


Continuation of Pay administration program to minimize employee abuse


of Continuation of Pay without limiting justifiable claims. 
 These programs


should be tailored to each NASA center.


2. Wherever possible NASA should have a medical officer on-site at all


centers and develop a joint "Medical-Safety Office" organization intimately


familiar with the operational safety and health aspects of the center


it serves.


vii


9. Activate an independent safety/design review group at each center to,


support and critique NASA designed experiments and facility modifications


in high risk situations. Have them report directly to NASA Center adminis­

trator through the Executive Safety Meeting organization.
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I. INTRODUCTION


I. 	 INTRODUCTION


Weiner Associates, acting as an independent contractor and evaluator


for 	 the NASA under contract NASW-2903, has undertaken and completed


the 	 following tasks in fulfilling the contract requirements ,ofthis


study:


Specifically, Weiner Associates performed analysis of NASA's


accident/injury/illnass and health data by having:


1. 	 Completed an on-site study of the existing data, cited above,


at NASA Headquarters and two (2)NASA field installations; namely,


Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland and Langley.


Research Center located in Hampton, Virginia. This on-site


study included data from one (1) prime contractor at each of


the designated NASA field centers. In conducting this study,


Weiner Associates examined all available data, which included


safety and health records, safety operations, and potential


hazards at NASA Headquarters and the above NASA field centers,


for the purpose of determining reported and unreported mishaps


and/or losses in the areas required by the Occupational Safety


and HeaIth Act (OSHA) and NASA reporting systems.


2. 	 Evaluated and analyzed the above study findings to develop


criteria for the subsequent implementation of safety and health


standards which will assist NASA in compliance with the Occu­

pational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970 and Executive


Order 11807.


3. 	 Prepared a graphical loss control assessment of NASA efforts


for the last three (3)years, in contrast to other governmental


agencies and private organizations of a similar size and scope


of operation, for the same duration of time.
 

4. 	 Recommended means to reduce accident rates, and associated equip­

ment losses, and improve the wovk environment and employee morale,


II APPROACH


by wkich the effectiveness of NASA safety, health and loss control


efforts can be measured.


5. This work was completed during the period of July through December


of 1976..


II. APPROACH


This study included five distinct tasks:


1. A compilation of available statistical data from NASA, government,


and private sources and then, as required, revision* of these data


according to a single reporting standard (OSHA).


2. An evaluation of these data, using autocorrelation**, to minimize


the influence of random fluctuations on its general functional


character. Autocorrelation is a modern analytical technique which is


used extensively to process information.


3. A detailed survey of the in-depth reports of the accident and ­
loss statistics gathered from the NASA facilities and NASA Contrac­
tors investigated. 
4. Personal visits to and observations of the day-to-day workings


and administration of the Safety and Health offices at the NASA


centers investigated. This included discussions with the respon­

sible safety officers on general and specific accident and loss


situations at their facilities; sitting in as observers at the


Executive Safety Meetings held at these facilities and in-depth


discussions with the NASA contractor safety officers at LRC


and GSFC.


5. Tests of certain key hypotheses through the use of personnel


questionnaires to generate actual feedback on the attitudes and


circumstances surrounding special lost time injuries.


Through the utilization of these five methods a picture of the


accident and loss profile of the three NASA centers of interest
 

has been generated which is based not only on a statistical treat­

ment of available information but a real test of the hypotheses


*Cf. Appendix B. Calculator program, Day-Count


**Cf. Appendix B. Calculator program, Autocorrelation
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III OSHA of 1970 
Exec. Order 11807


*of the reasons for major loss items uncovered in this study.


Our overall objective in this work was not to repeat statistical


treatments of this data already available, but rather to look


'at it in a new way that would allow determination of significance


and real cause trends of the losses reported.


III. 	 THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY ACT OF 1970 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11807


The details of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and


Executive Order 11807 of 1974 are reproduced in Appendix A of this r6ort.


Executive Order 11807 broughtFederal workers under the same umbrella


of occupational safety and health rules as workers in private industry.


As such, the Federal government, and in particular each agency of


the government, has been assigned certain specific responsibilities


as to the creation, management and administration of the agency's


occupational safety and health program consistent with the 1970


Occupational Safety and Health Act's provisions; establishment of an


occupational safety and health management information system inclusive


of detailed recordkeeping; establishment of procedures for the adoption


of agency occupational safety and health standards consistent with


the 1970 Act; provide adequate safety and health training for agency


employees; preparation and submission to the Secretary of Labor


of an annual report containing such information as the Secretary shall


prescribe and to cooperate with and assist the Secretary of Labor


in performance of his duties as well as observing the guidelines


published by the Secretary pursuant to Section S of Executive Order


11807.


The framework and intent of Executive Order 11807 and the 1970 Act


have been used as an evaluatory tool throughout this study in order


to examine NASA compliance as called out in the contractual statement


of work shown in Section I of this report.
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-IV NASA LOSS 
COMPARISUNS 
..IV. NASA -- AGENCY-WIDE RELATIVE LOSS COMPARISONS


Inorder to put in proper perspective the significance of the injury


frequency and severity data at LRC, GSFC and HQ, itwas necessary to


analyze the complete chronological loss profile from all sources of


the entire agency from 1971 through 1975.


Table IV-l below shows the chronological distribution of monetary


losses for material, lost time and medical/death benefit compensation


charge backs. Material losses are the sum of all fire, auto, aircraft


and other mishaps at NASA centers. Mission failure costs and 'contractor


losses are not included in these losses.


Table IV-l Relative Loss Comparisons


for All NASA Centers 1971-1975


Non-Aircraft


Total NASA Material Lost Time Medical/Death


Year Losses $xlO 6 Losses $xlO 6 $xlO6 Benefits $xlO


1971 6.92 	 5.9 	 .08
	 .94


1972 4.90 2.7 .93 1.27


1973 11.9 7.9 2.82 1.18


1974 3.0 .985 .223 1.80


1975 7.1 4.8 .180 2.12


Totals $xl0 6 33.82 22.29 4.23 	 7.31


Medical and death benefits are those costs charged against NASA as


reimbursement to the Federal Employees Compensation Fund for payments


made on account of work related injury or death of NASA employees


or persons under the jurisdiction of NASA. Table IV-1 shows that


about one-third of all NASA losses were associated with lost time and


medical/death benefits while about two-thirds of the total NASA loss


was 	 tied to material losses.


Before a final comparison of these figures is attempted it is


necessary to break down material losses into its component loss


factors ifi order to identify the cost of those elements that are


random catastrophies (i.e., auto accidents, aircraft crashes) that


normal industrial safety programs have minimal influence on.
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Table IV-2 below shows such a breakdown.


Table IV-2 Breakdown of NASA


Material Losses* 1971-1975


$ x 106 $xlO 6 $ x 106
 $x10 6 Other 
Year Aircraft Fire AlTAuto Material Losses Totals


1971 2.0 .351 .010 3.6 5.9 
1972 2.01 - .133 .014 .540 2.7 
1973 3.68 .18 .008 4.00*** 7.9 
1974 .148 .120 .018 .698 .985 
1975 .092 4.0** .019 .617 4.8 
Totals 7.93 4.78 .069 9.524 22.3 
* 	 Does not include mission failure or contractor losses 
= $.827 x 106** 	 1975 Small fire loss 
1975 Major fire loss = $3.2 x 106 
* NASA contractor dropped payload


Therefore, based on Table IV-2, the material losses that can be


considered as non-random and amenable to reduction from tighter administra­

tion of existing safety programs or the upgrading of these programs through


better detection, training and equipment methods total about $14.3 x 106,


or about 65% of the total for the six years evaluated in this study.


This is about the same order of magnitude as the lost time and medical/


death-benefits portion ($11.54 x 106) of the total NASA loss spectrum


over the years 1971-1975.


However, another important consideration must be injected into


this evaluation before any conclusions are drawn as to loss significance


of the total NASS loss profile. This consideration has to do with


how real losses affect total NASA financial planning -- lost time and


medical/death benefits are real costs that NASA must take out of its


operating budgets and more important are costs that must be paid in


the sense that they cannot be deferred.
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Therefore, as lost time and industrial injuries grow, so do


the costs NASA must pay to the Federal Employees Compensation Fund.


These costs have more than doubled since 1971 while the overall NASA


operating budget has dropped about 3% during this same period. There­

fore, lost time and medical/death benefits are significantly affecting


the available dollars that NASA has for its prime mission directives.


On the other hand, losses due to fire, expl sion and material failures


affect equipment, structures and/or facilities that may not have to be


replaced immediately or, if they do, a capital cost outlay much smaller


than real replacement costs could suffice to do the jobs (i.e., rent­

ing, relocating or borrowing from other NASA or Government activities).


Certainly when a major piece of equipment such as a wind tunnel


has a catastrophic failure in the middle of a priority program, the


NASA Administrator must allocate reserves from other funds to repair


-e facility. However, this has been the exception, not the rule in the


past.


Therefore,the significance of analyzing and reducing lost time


and industrial injury losses represents a major factor in NASA loss


control activities. In addition, the significance of losses from


major fires and explosions at NASA facilities is also a key element


in realizable overall loss control because of the potential for


eliminating and/or controlling the magnitude of the loss through


the application of new detection and firefighting technology and


upgrading the administration of present safety programs.
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V. THE DATA, SOURCES, REPORTING SYSTEMS AND PHILOSOPHY OF ANALYSIS


.I. DATA USED AND SOURCES


The first source of data used extensively in this study came from


the yearly summary documents completed by the NASA HQ Safety and


Environmental Health Office between the years 1970 and 1975, as


shown in Refs. 1-7. General injury and loss information is presented


in these reports for all NASA facilities during the years listed


and detailed summaries of both accident and property damage incidents


are described.


Since the requirements of our contract focused in on just three


of the NASA centers, LRC, GSFC and HQ, an in-depth survey of the


accident and injury data at these centers was completed on-site.


These surveys consisted of gathering all the Monthly Accident


Experience Reports recorded on NASA form 344 for the years 1971


through the second quarter of 1976 for each facility.


These reports gave us the raw data necessary for the evaluation


of lost time accidents, non-lost time accidents and property damage


as a function of time, divisional elements of the facility, activity


and number of employees. In-depth accident reports were reviewed


for all the lost time and a representative sample of the non-lost


time accidents at all three facilities. These reports were avail­

able from LRC, GSFC and HQ files as NASA Form 95 or the equivalent


at each facility Personnel records were reviewed in confidence


by the NASA personnel offices at each facility, wherever cross­

checks on lost time charges and medical histories were necessary


for our study and the results transmitted to our technical staff


in a non-personal way which complied with the "Privacy Act". 
 The


same technique was used in collecting data from the medical offices


at these facilities.


Crosschecks of all NASA data generated internally were also made


against the Quarterly OSHA reports submitted by NASA facilities


directly to the U.S. Department of Labor DMDS-OSHA on 102F and


102FF forms.
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NASA on-site contractor injury, accident and property damage


information was also gathered primarily from the support contractors
 

own quarterly OSHA 102 forms and personal interviews with the


safety officers of each support contractor. These interviews were


primarily geared to get overall perspective on the complete safety


operations and programs of the support contractor in context to


the actual facility and operations of that facility that"the con­

tractor was asked to fulfill. In addition, opinions as to the


reasons for trends in accidents, various employee morale problems


and the techniques of administration, management and judgments


made as to cataloging various types of accidents inthe reporting


systems available to the support contractor were discussed.


In order to develop the data base necessary to make meaningful


comparisons between changes inNASA accident injury and loss histories


with those of the total Federal government and specific similar


government and private organizations or segments of private industry,


Weiner Associates researched, contacted and/or collected data


from the following sources:


.*The U.S. Department of Labor


* The National Safety Council


* The Department of Defense


* The Association of Aerospace Industries


* The U.S. Energy Research and Development Agency


The American Society of Safety Engineers
 

'Details of these data are shown in references 8 through 23.


Two other useful sources of information were used incompleting or


evaluating the results of this study. Observation of the workings


of the Executive Safety Meetings at LRC and GSFC and the results of


a special questionnaire circulated to LRC personnel who had major


Continuation of Pay lost time claims. Details of both these sources


are discussed in Section VI of this report.
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2. 	 REPORTING SYSTEMS


During the period 1972 through 1976 when the majority of the


statistical data used for evaluation and comparisons in this


study was generated, both the Federal government and private


industry were making a major transition in their accident and


injury reporting formats from the older ANSI Z16.1 formats to


the new OSHA 102 and 101 forms of reporting industrial' accident


statistics.


The older Z16.1 standard established a uniform mechanism for


recording occupational injuries and diseases and computing an


incidence based upon employee exposure. Itwas designed to


evaluate the progress in preventing accidents, injuries,


and diseases in a given establishment or industry. The system


is independent of workers compensation laws or the decisions of


workers compensation agencies. The introduction of the standard


states: "Thorough investigation of all factors relating to the


occurrence of each reported injury is essential. Determination as


to whether or not the injury should be considered a work injury


under the provisions of this standard shall be based upon the


evidence developed in such investigations." A work injury


is defined as any injury or disease suffered by a person which


arises out of and in the course of his employment.


If the definitions and procedures were followed objectively, it


would be possible to compare the experience of different industries


whether they were in the same state or different states with


differing definitions of what constituted an injury.


However, it is doubtful that all injuries or diseases are inves­

tigated as thoroughly as the introduction suggests. Certain


.classes of injuries are treated as special cases. For example,


inguinal hernias are recorded as work injuries only if they are


precipitated by an impact,sudden effort, or severe strain and


meet all three of these conditions.
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Similarly, back injuries are recorded only if there is evidence


of an accident or a task that could have produced the injury.
 

Another exception concerns injuries resulting from external


events originating outside the employment, which are not recorded


as work injuries. However, in many cases this type of injury


is reported by the employee as a work-related injury and careful


judgment by the Safety Office is required. Sometimes judgments


are made that exclude the employee from a legitimate claim and


sometimes the employee will prevail on an unjust claim.


From this it can be seen that the number of injuries that would


be recorded for measurement purposes are inevitably going to be


different than the correct number because of individual judgmental


and extenuating factors made by the recording authorities.


Therefore, the government through OSHA developed a new recording


system for reporting industrial and occupational injury data


which had as its objective the elimination of the judgmental


reporting factors that plagued the quality of the earlier ANSI


Z16.1 reporting system.


Several basic factors had to be taken into consideration in


this study that were effects of the change-over (from ANSI to


OSHA) at NASA. They are:


All NASA facilities did not change their reporting systems


at the same time.


The results of interpretation of total lost time from industrial


accidents was inherently reduced by a factor of about 2/7ths


between the ANSI and OSHA reporting systems because the ANSI


system counted its total lost time inclusive of weekends while


the OSHA system looks only at real lost work days.


The literalness of the OSHA reporting system may have prompted


the NASA safety officers at the facilities evaluated in this


report to include accidents in their reports that would not have


been considered under past Z16.1 systems. Weiner Associates, Inc.
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did not question the judgment of the safety officer at each NASA facility


relative to his classification, inclusion or non-inclusio'of any individual


accident reported by him. Rather, we reviewed the entire trends of such


reported information and tried to make final judgment as to the significance


of the data over the long term.


3. Accident Analysis Philosophy
 

There is a gap between the techniques used to evaluate the hazards


of space missions and those used for large work operations. In this section


we shall discuss how one can practically analyze the latter operations.


The diversity of activity in these operations tends to preclude specific math­

ematical models. It can be argued that effort put into analysis might better­

be devoted to the business of detecting unsafe conditions and changing them.


Nonetheless, some numerical records are kept mainly to determine the effec­

tiveness of the continuing investment which most organizations make to main­

tain safe operations.


The contention that statistics lie is rarely true. The count of, e.g.,


number of injuries or number of lost work days, is usually very accurate.


The problem with statistics usually has to do with their meaning, not


only quantatively but also in a qualitative sense. To illustrate the latter


aspect; good safety policy requires that minor accidents be reported because


there may be some clues, in these accidents, to unknown hazards. Assume


within-a given operation such a policy was suddenly implemented. Obviously,


the injury count would also increase. Quantative difficulty with accident
 

statistics follows from the random timing of accidents. Here, to accurately


calculate the frequency of accidents, the time interval must be large enough


for the randomness to truly average out. The National Safety Council uses


a three-year time interval to determine annual reference rates for entire indus.


tries. There are analytic techniques which can lend some quantitative meaning i


accident data. Qualitatively, simply taking a probablistic view can provide


insight into cause and effect relationships.


Any given accident is a physical event. Itwas caused by a set of physica,


conditions. If the event happened, the probability of its occurrence was one.


Physical conditions are not all static, of course; some exist only momentarily


as the consequence of some human act.
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Essentially the same physical conditions may exist for protracted periods.


of time without the occurrence of an accident. This common observation has


given rise to a probablistic view of accidents. Whether this view is of much


use in identifying a particular set of unsafe conditions may be argued. An


accident is usually a more complicated process than the definitions of accident


probability terms simply imply. Be that as itmay, the following terms


which are incommon use, represent useful concepts:


Hazard is a condition with the potential of causing ap adverse effect, e.g.,"


an injury. It is a possibility with units of number (fraction) per


unit time or'act.


Example:


H = 0.02 injuries/man hour


Danger is exposure to a hazard. The units of danger may be a period of time
 

or an act. Danger is the antonym of safety.


Example:


E = 2.5 man hours (of exposure)


Accident Probability is the product of hazard and exposure to that hazard.


Example:


N = HE = (.02)(2.5) 0.05 injuries


Damage is the seriousness of an adverse effect. Damage is usually expressed in


units which can be broadly applied.


Example:


= 3.5 lost work days/injury or


= $450/injury


Risk is the product of the probability of an accident and the damage attending


the accident.


Example:


R = NT = HET = (.05)(3.5) = 0.175 lost work days or


= (.05)(450) = $22.50


Benefit isthe favorable effect of an activity or an act. Presumably it


represents the reason for the activity (or act). It is sometimes


difficult to quantify, is usually expressed ineconomic units.


Example:


B = $6000 
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Risk-Benefit isa quotient, risk divided by benefit, nominally dimensionless.


Very low values are, of course, desirable.


Example:


-3
 
R/B = $22.50/$6000 = 3.75 x lO
 
Probable events and observed events, of course, have the same physical


dimensions. Thus, corresponding to an accident probability of 0.05 injuries,


there may be a 
normalized number of 0.05 observed injuries. 
 Note, that ifa


risk is realized it becomes a loss. Inthat instance, we shall replace the symbol


R with the symbol L.


Socially, the acceptability of a risk depends on the risk-benefit quotient.


The use of matches isa good example. There is a very small but finite prob­

ability, virtually every time a 
 match is struck, that the head will fragment


and that a fragment will hit the user inthe eye (ifthe user does not wear


glasses). 
 The general feeling is that the benefit of this convenient and inexpen­

sive means of starting fires outweighs the risk.


With regard to the individual, it has been said that every man is a 
 safety


expert. This is a true statement. We all continuously face risk-benefit sit­

uations and, in general, do a remarkably good job of handling them. People,


consciously or unconsciously, take risks in inverse proportion to their precon­

ception of the risk. 
 When a willful act has contributed to an accident, there


frequently was a faulty preconception of risk. The office worker who hurts his


back while moving his file cabinet is an example.


Regarding accidents which may involve bodily injury, the usual unit of


danger (exposure) is simply a
willful act. Inthese situations, the risks may be


classified as follows:


Common Acts 
 Risk i


Acceptable Risk Questionable Risk' Outrageous Risk


Unsafe Acts


Fig. V-1 Risk and Exposure Classification
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An example of acceptable risk is setting and hammering nails. Here the accident


probability (chance) is low and the damage (consequence of the accident) is


low. An example of a questionable risk is jerking on a wench handle in tight


quarters. Here the accident probability is high, but the damage isusually


low. The wench jerker inthis example, in effect or inactuality, makes a risk­

benefit judgment. An example of an outrageous risk is working in a high place


without safety lines. Here the accident probability is generally classed as


high and the damage is certainly high.


Acceptable risks, then, relate low probability and low damage and outrageous


risks relate high probability and high damage. Questionable risks involve judg­

ment because although one of the parameters is low the other one is high. (The


probability of an accident is,of course, frequently a function of-skill.)


It is possible to calculate the probability of an accident from scratch,


starting with such basic things as the uncertainties in the structure of matter.


Hazard calculations of this sort are made for nuclear reactors. For more ordinary


accident situations, one must start with the record of prior accidents, i.e.,


the number of events.


With regard to work accidents which involve bodily injury, the usual measure


of accidental damage is the injury period innumber of lost work days. The in­

jury statistics for a given work activity reflect the nature of the risk situations


associated with that activity. That is,if the number of injuries is large enough


to have statistical meaning. Thus, ifthe injury periods are short, the accidents


associated with that activity probably involve, mainly, the taking of acceptable


risks. If,in some entirely different work activity, the number of injuries per


worker is high, even though the injury periods are short, then it appears that


these workers are taking questionable risks.


A work operation which is large enough to generate meaningful statistics


usually comprises a number of diverse activities. Particular activities do not


usually stand out in the injury statistics. Nonetheless, it should be borne in


mind that the nature of the risk associated with each activity is frequently


unique (and may be acceptable). The hazards in the chemistry laboratory are


independent of the hazards in the machine shop are independent of the hazards


inthe foundry, etc. Workers are generally localized relative to hazards, super­

vision, etc.


Consider a hypothetical example: a work operation involves just three


activities; hammering nails, loosening nuts intight places, and washing windows


on high buildings. The consequences of accidents are, respectively; banged
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fingers, broken elbows, and "busted backs". The management of the work


operation is devoid of safety consciousness, so the respective hazard values


are fixed. Although the number of workers engaged ineach activity is the


same, they take chances according to their perception of risk. Hence, nail


hammerers are injured more frequently than wrench jerkers and wrench jerkers


are injured more frequently than window washers. Injury histograms appear


as follows:


50 Y1:t-,:'** i '-L 
bangied fingers 
40 1F ril ts 
30 7T 
o
2P


Cla­
10 10 ,broken elbows7r-. I bEd,­
0 5 10 20 30 - days- 250 
Injury Recovery Period 
Fig. V-2. Hypothetical Injury Histogram
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-f 
200 busted backs 
150 ,tHt 
100 broken el bo t 
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'aed fingers I_ ,+ 
THp I L ' rrr-­
0 5 10 20 30 -days- 250
 
Injury Recovery Period 
Fig. V-3. Hypothetical Loss Histogram
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Inthis example, since the hazard values are fixed, the injury density.


is an exact measure of the productivity of the operation. Ifthe number of


injuries declines, the time that the workers are exposing themselves to work must


also be declining. The objective of the management of this operation is,of


-course, net benefit, which is production minus loss.- Looking at the functions,


itappears that eliminating broken elbows and busted backs would cut lost work


days markedly. Itmay also be noted that such a reduction in loss would not


change the total number of injuries much. Conversely, reductng the number of


banged fingers would not change the total number of lost work days much.


In actuality, of course, safety considerations are very much a part of most


work operations and large operations have active safety programs. Managements


are not solely motivated by net benefit. Exposing an employee to hazards which


can cause him serious damage is considered immoral and is illegal relative to .


OSHArequirements. Be that as itmay, the overall characteristics of the hypo­

thetical-example are fairly universal.


The fact that there isa class of risks generally held to be acceptable 
does not mean, in most instances, that these risks cannot be minimized without 
an undue effect on the associated benefits. Worker care and skill can reduce 
both danger-and hazard. Of course, entirelyapart from the worker, hazards can 
be reduced and eliminated. 
As is conmon practice, we shall refer to the integral of a density function


as a distribution function. Sometimes one function seems to carry more meaning


than the other. At any rate, if,as has been stated, workers take chances


according to their perception of risk (or any of the other probability terms),


mathematical models for the injury and loss distributions (or densities) can


be readily formulated. Unfortunately, these models do not correlate with the


observed distributions very well, probably because hazards and workers are local­

ized inunequal proportions. For largorganizations engaged in diverse work


activities, the observed injury distributuion appears more or less as a straight


line on a semilog grid. We shall take this line as the reference injury distrib­

ution. It is qualitatively plausible and has the advantage of being mathematically


simple. Fig V-4 shows the injury number distribution for 1973 for NASA Langley


Research Center..
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Superimposed on the observed data is the reference distribution line, which was


located by the method of least squares. In the process of fitting the line to the


data, injury periods of one day or less were not considered. A datum point

corresponding to non-lost-time injuries would be above the upper margin of the graph.


Near-misses and short-term injuries appear to comprise a separate accident category.


The equation for the reference distribution of number of injuries as a function


of injury period is

 N{3> tr Noet/A. (1) 
the number of injuries N having injury periods , equal or greater than some in­

terval t, is a function of two parameters, No, the total number of injuries, and A,


a characteristic of the work situation. 
 If we weight each injury in equation (1)by


the injury period, we obtain the distribution of injury lost-time as a function of


injury period,

 L{T > t = 4Ne(t + A)et/A, (2) 
the injury lost-time L associated with injuries having injury periods ', equal or


greater than some interval of time t. Note that when we consider
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all injury periods, i.e., when t = 0, the total injuryjlost-timeequals 
N0A. Thus, 
A= L (3)N 
0


The parameter A is, therefore, the mean injury period.


There are, of course, density functions for the distributions 'given


in equations (1)and (2). The density function for injury ,ost-time has


a maximum. This maximum represents the injury period which has the


greatest differential impact, in terms of lost time, to the work operation


as a whole. It also gives some additional meaning to the parameter A,


since the maximum is located at


tmax = A (4) 
Ifwe divide L by L0 and equate the quotient to one-half, we can


determine the injury period which cuts injury lost-time in half. It turns
 

out that for this condition


tl/2 = 1.678A. (5) 
As an example, consider the safety record at Langley in 1973:


No = 21 Injuries


Lo = 925 man days


A = 44 days


tmax -= 44 days


tl/2 = 74 days


N(tm) = 7.7 injuries 
N(t1/2) = 3.9 injuries 
About four employees accounted for half of the lost-time. A mean injury


period of 44 days is relatively high.
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The general proposition isthat some faction of all accidents which


occur are the result of taking acceptable risks. As the injury period


approaches zero, the fraction becomes very large. When the injury is


long, the fraction tends to be small, but not necessarily zero. The person


who slips inan icy parking lot and breaks a hip has taken what is con­

sidered an acceptable risk, dangerous as walking on ice may be.


In recent years, safety work is commonly referred to'as loss control.


It is evident from both the hypothetical and from the Langley examples, that the,


loss from injuries comes mainly from the severe cases. As we shall see in


the statistics section, VI, most of these accidents resulted from unsafe


acts, the taking of risks which are generally held to be unacceptable..


Actually, or effectively, the victim usually had a faulty preconception of


the hazard. Generally, these accidents had little incommon with those


producing minor injuries where the risk taken was controlled and the physical


consequence was limited.


4. Autocorrelation


There isa classic reliability anecdote about a new design for a fuse


where the probability of malfunction had been precalculated as two per 100,000


fuses. The first fuse tested failed. The intent of the anecdote is to


illustrate there is no preferred sequence for random events. With regard­

to accidents, if the physical conditions are essentially constant, when an


accident occurs, isa matter of chance. Statistics, ingeneral, frequently


display major fluxuations which we cannot ascribe to basic changes in physical


conditions. This characteristic isevident in the economy, in the climate,


and in accident records.


The-mathematical technique for removing random fluxuations from a time


series, such as an accident record, iscalled autocorrelation. Inthe sections


which follow most of the data has been autocorrelated. Inmost instances,


the original data, un-autocorrelated, are also presented on the same graph


or inan accompanying table. These autocorrelations are conservative in


the sense that integrals of un-autocorrelated and autocorrelated data over


a given period of time are equal. The term image is applied to any data


which has been processed mathematically.
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ON-SITEVI 
INVESTIGATION


VI. ON-SITE INVESTIGATION


1. NATURE OF FACILITIES


1.1 LANGLEY RESEARCH CENTER


General Discription


The NASA Langley Research Center is the oldest of NASA's laboratories


and has been in continuous operation for almost 50 years. Its present


compliment of scientists, engineers, technicians, workers and adminis­

trative personnel numbers approximately 3,400 employees. Present


activities at LRC encompass the following operations:


Basic Flight Research Programs such as


Flight Test Operations


Flight Dynamics and Control


Flight Instrumentations


Aeronautical Systems


Flight Research


Basic Aeronautical and Space Research


Subsonic and Transonic Aerodynamics


High Speed Aerodynamics


Research Facility Engineering


Space Systems


Space Applications and Technology


Special Projects Management


* Viking Projects Group


* Flight Projects Group


Basic Support Research


* Structures and Dynamics


* Systems Engineering


* Plant and Facilities Engineering


* Etc.


This facility can be classified as a major aerospace systems facility.


It is equipped to carry out complex fabrication and testing jobs of


any magnitude on aerospace systems from models to full scale. Its


wind tunnel operations and facilities are extensive and require the


full gambit of heavy equipment and rigging support.


Its shops, hangar facilities, test chambers and physical plant
 

are reminiscent of a heavy duty manufacturing and large aerospace test


range environment.
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General Observations


Langley augments its in-house safety programs through the use


of


a) A detailed monthly accident, injury and significant incident


reporting system wherein all accidents of any nature are required


to be reported and documented insufficient detail to determine


the cause of the accident, the nature of the injury, the time,


place and activity in progress, the person involved, the nature


and extent of any property damage, the extent of any required


medical treatment and the amount of lost-time,if any, during


the reporting period.


Personal injury reports that generate lost-time beyond one


day are tracked by the Langley Safety Office on a month to month


basis and carried through on each successive monthly NASA form


344 so that all lost time per individual accident can be summarized


on an annual basis.


Inaddition, a separate quarterly OSHA form 102 is prepared


for the entire facility from the internal monthly NASA 344's and


sent to the Department of Labor.


b) A full time professional safety staff whose duties consist of:


Evaluating, administrating and enforcing NASA safety-standards


and procedures on-site.


Investigating and reporting on all Type A/Type B Accidents


and Incidents and Mission Failure accidents with emphasis on


cause, effect, and remedial action.


Conducting overall safety training of LRC personnel and


upgrading the general safety awareness of the work force.


Overall emergency and disaster planning for the total LRC


facility including on the scene administration of the event.


Specification, procurement, installation and maintenance


of general safety equipment, hazard detection, control and


communications equipment and the operation of a complete


firefighting and security force.


c), Administration and participation in a detailed hazards and


potential hazards feedback loop through the mechanism of the monthly


Executive Safety Meeting.
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-This most effective management tool brings together middle


management personnel representing each major working element of


thetLRC complex with the Health & Safety Office and LRC Director's


office management to discuss in detail progress on all in-house


safety and security programs, emergency plans, and the reconstruction


and critique of all on-site Type A/B accidents and incidents that


occurred during the period.


Candid discussion of accidents, their cause, costs and effective


remedial action is undertaken. Detailed technical reports, films and


are developed
in some cases, complete reconstructions of the inci'dent, 
 
and detailed plans for elimination of the hazard or protection from


future similar incidents are formulated. Follow-up on past recom­

mendation and corrective actions of the Executive Safety Meeting are


investigated and updated.


The concept of the Executive Safety Meeting is an effective and


important tool in maintaining the quality of LRC's on-site safety


activities.


1.2 GODDARD SPACE FLIGHT CENTER


General Discription


1.3 	 GODDARD SPACE FLIGHT LABORATORIES


The NASA Goddard Space Flight Lab is a modern research and operations


center for the development, assembly, environmental testing and tracking,


and data collection of near-space civilian spacecraft.
operational control 

Its present compliment of scientists, engineers, technicians, workers and


administrative personnel numbers approximately 3900 employees..


The general nature of the work at Goddard,while heavily research oriented,


is not of the same nature as Langley. GSFC does not have the heavy industrial


capability that LRC does. Its major fabrication programs are carried out


by private contractors off-site and assembly of the space frame and attendant


electronics are carried out by the contractor at GSFC.


Significant environmental testing is done, however, at GSFC including


a large vacuum chamber, structural,
full scale spacecraft systems check-out in 
 
vibration, electro-mechanical/electronic performance and qualification testing.
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Inaddition to these activities, major long range mission planning


and systems design as well as subsystem mock-ups are provided and tested.


Sounding rocket programs are carried out in conjunction with launch facilities


in the U.S. and abroad.


Finally, major tracking and computer control and data collection


operations are administered by GSFC through their world wide network of tracking


stations and ships. Data isprocessed at GSFC for the U.S. Weather Service


as well as other scientific and defense oriented agencies of the U.S. Government,


foreign governments and in some cases, commercial organizations. GSFC can


be categorized as a light manufacturing assembly and softwear operation


heavy in scientific research and systems testing.


General Observations


In general, GSFC augments its overall in-house safety programs through


the use of the same administrative and operational tools as LRC. However,


monthly accident and injury data is not published inthe same manner as LRC


although CA-I and CA-2 forms are used. Quarterly OSHA reports are submitted


to the U.S. Department of Labor and a formal annual report "GSFC Accident/Injury


Summary" is published by the GSFC Office of Health and Safety which details,


indepth, a complete analysis of all accident/injury information at the


center as well as all causes, remedial actions and results of in-house


activities to reduce and control Types A/B accident and incidents.


The activities of the GSFC Office of Health and Safety are similar to


those detailed for LRC and the administrative mechanism of the Executive Safety


Meeting is a major source of feedback and self-corrective activity at the


center.


1.3 NASA HEADQUARTERS


General Description.


The NASA Headquarters in Washington, D.C. can be categorized as a typical


corporate headquarters operation. It is strictly involved in program manage­

ment, computer operations, administrative guidance of the NASA centers around


the country, budget control and liaison with other elements of the Federal Govern­

ment as well as the private sector. Its present compliment of administrative and


scientific personnel numbers approximately 1700. Its basic product is planning,


paper, financial control and warehousing.
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General Observations


In general, NASA Headquarters augments its overall in-house safety


programs ghrough the efforts of a single, part-time safety officer. Because


of the nature of the work done at Headquarters, major industrial accidents


and injuries do not occur.


Headquarters does report its injuries on CA-i and CA-2 type forms


and complies with the record keeping requirements of Executive Order 1108


through quarterly OSHA 102 form submissions to the Department of Labor.


Headquarters does not use the mechanism of the Executive Safety


Meeting to implement in-house safety programs.


2. RECORD OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES


2.1 ANALYTICAL APPROACH


Inthe safety arts, there are established ways of presenting injury


statistics. These ways have some shortcomings of which we should be aware.


The injury record is,in general, comprised of a pair of numbers. There


are actually two such number pairs incommon use, a raw data pair and a


parameter pair. The raw data pair takes the form,


(N,L),


where N is the number of injuries and L isthe time lost from work as a


consequence of those injuries. The number of injuries is taken for a


given time interval. The parameter pair takes the form,


(F,S),
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1where F is the injury frequency, the number of injuries per 200,000


man-hours worked during the given time interval and S is the injury


severity, the time lost per 200,000 man-hours worked during the given


time interval (OSHA definition).


Either pair of numbers can present some difficulty. Consider the raw


data pair. The time lost from a given injury can readily extend beyond


the time interval which one wants to consider. Itmay be a long time


after the given time interval before the time lost as a consequence of the


injuries occurring in that time interval is known. Calculation of the


parameter pair ignores this problem since the data simply reflects the


given time interval, but itmust be borne in mind, that in terms of


cause, the severity parameter does not necessarily correspond to the


frequency parameter. That is,the injuries, which gave rise to the


frequency in a given time interval, may appear inthe severity in later


time intervals. Serious injuries, which usually account for most of the


lost time, run on and on. Moreover, the scaling which is done on the basis


of time-worked in the current time interval may be misleading if the


injury occurred at an earlier time interval when the time-worked was


different.


Probably the greatest difficulty in the evaluation of a safety record


comes about from the random nature of accidents. Within some fairly long


period of time, the physical conditions attending an accident and employee


exposure to these conditions ismore-or-less constant -- or the probability


of the physical conditions occurring and the probability of employee exposure


ismore-or-less constant. Hence, when an accident occurs, in a broad sense,


isa matter of chance.


The safety records of most organizations show a great deal of fluctuation


and the shorter the time intervals considered the more pronounced is the


effect. Does an apparent increase or decrease ineither of the number


pairs, or one member of a number, represent a real change or is it simply


a random fluctuation, is a common question; and, with regard to the


severity parameter, how much of it represents carry-over from a prior


injury.


For the study of the NASA injury records we have elected to use a


third number pair,


(No,A),
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where No is the number of lost time injuries where the lost-time from


each injury exceeds one day and where A is the total lost-time, L.
,


from those injuries divided by No,


Lo
 A 
 N


0


The number of employees during the overall period of the study was nearly


constant so that use of frequency and severity would be superflous.


The one-day lost-time injuries have been omitted because they becloud


the record. They frequently simply represent time required for diagnosis:


Their contribution to the total lost time isusually small. The term


'we believe is somewhat more meaningful than total lost-time; it not


only indicates how serious the injuries have been, italso isthe maximum


of the hypothetical loss density function. In terms of loss, it indicates


what really matters.


A study performed some time after the injuries have-occurred, of course,


has the advantage that the lost-time from serious injuries can be readily


added up. To assure that the means of determination of lost-time for


each injury was consistent, we have used the initial date(s) of absence


from work and the date(s) of return to work in a perpetual calendar


calculator program. The program calculates the number of working days


missed due to the injury. The program simply assumes Monday through


Friday are working days. The number Lo contains some error because the


employee may have had other working days and because it ignores holidays.


Each of the accident reports was reviewed and a factor triplet,


(GI," G2, G3)1


was assigned to the accident, where the G's represent the cause of the


accident. G1 represents improper behavior, i.e., unsafe act, G2 represents


improper environment, i.e., unsafe mechanical conditions, and G3 represents


other cause, i.e., acts of God. The sum of the three factors equals one.


Thus, the triplet (.2, .3,.5)represents a subjective judgment that


an unsafe act contributed 20 per cent to the cause of an accident, unsafe


conditions contributed 30 per cent to the cause of the accident, and 50


per cent of the cause was unassignable. Consider the accident where a


man bends over to pick up a paperclip from the floor and as a consequence


of the act suffers a serious back injury. Moreover, there isno prior


history of back trouble. The representative-triplet is (0,0, 1).
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Average values have been taken as the factors in the triplet for an organ­

ization on some time interval. Thus, the triplet (.36, .07, .57) represents


an organization where 57 per cent of the accidents appear to be acts of God.


The injury statistics which we have developed for NASA are, then,


comprised of the pair (NO, A) and the triplet (G1, G2, G3). We have taken


these data for half-year intervals, starting with the first half of 1971


and ending with the first half of 1976. These data have been processed


with an autocorrelation program to remove the characteristic fluctuations.


The criterion used to select the value of the autocorrelation coefficient,


a, was that the image, i.e., the product of the autocorrelation, should'


not show a significant component corresponding to the sampling frequency


of two times per year. The value of a turned out to be 2 half-year


intervals, 1 year. (This isa minimum rounded value for a. Inthe


limit, as a becomes very large, the image becomes essentially constant -­

the mean value of the data on the range.) Symbols capped with a wave


vinculum represent autocorrelated data. Thus we have the injury statistics,


(No,) and (G, 2G G3 ) " 
2.2 STATISTICAL RESULTS


Injury data pairs and triplets have been prepared for Goddard Space


Flight Center and Langley Research Center. The employee injury data from


NASA Headquarters is too thin for much statistical treatment. It should


be borne inmind that statistics do not explain themselves. The objective


of statistical study is to show what is analytically meaningful. The


physical explanation of things is usually a matter of logical inference.


Figures VI-lthrough VI-4 which follow present images of the injury data


pair (No, A), the number of lost-time injuries and the mean lost-time


period.


Fig. VI-l and Fig. VI'2 show both histographic No and autocorrelation


images No of the number of lost-time injuries. For Goddard, the auto­

correlation image shows that the number rate declined from 1971 until the


latter half of 1974. From that time through the first half of 1976,


the number rate has increased. The increase at Goddard in the last


year and a half has been 24 percent. For Langley, the autocorrelation


image shows a very similar pattern with the minimum occurring in the


27


5 
1x1070 1/ INCH' t46'414473' 
,Vx to INCHES I, U.A~.SA.
Icurz.ASSUtR CO. 
4 -4­
-g.-n V-I Hitogh icadAtcreainIae o ubro otTm H 
2 Fq~- ttt perjHal f-Year Interval odr pc lgtCne
Injuri1t 

1971at 92 93 93 97a17b17a17b17 ......... X92 
 
13 
I_;'-
-
4t 
 
+- ±jV 
7 
no191 
 
191 
 
tox OlOOINCNoLo /k-"E 7I/ X 10 INCHES 
 
kEUFFL & CSOCR 
"61473
 
.AI. I. U.S A,
 
Co.

,­ ig. VI-2 	 Histographic and Autocorrelation Images of Number of Lost Time

Injuries per Half-Year Interval at Langley Research Center .

Ab-	
±.. 
No 	 
NOSm per Interval 
Symmetric Autocorrelation,

Coefficient I Year

iM 
~~~~~~~~ 	 -	 - --42~+4p­TS5z~ 
 
t~ . 
3+
=E 	 
4+ 	 
4A 
*a - Jan. thru June

+V.1q;
b - duly thru Dec. 
­
-ft%4~~~ 	 
k14 	 
144tL214211W~~tlt 	 IhL 	 -­91 92 92 
97b172f92b17a 	 
b -JuytrD. 
93 
4,~IF44 
~ 44+ 
MHl.YaItra93 174a 94 
93 19417b17a
M 
h~1 'fh4 
97a17) 	 7a

same time interval, the latter half of 1974. The increase at'Langley


inthe last year and a half has been 35 percent. The histographic data,


of course, shows much greater changes in the injury number rate, but


these changes are not, at this juncture, analytically defensible. They


appear to be mostly random fluctuations.


Fig. VI-3 and VI-4 show the mean periods of lost-time from injuries, A


and A, at the two centers. These two functions are not so similar.


For Goddard, the mean period declined from 8.7 work days in the first


half of 1971 to 5.4 days in the latter half of 1973 and began to increase,


most markedly in 1975 and the first half of 1976, when it was 10.8 days.


The increase from the minimum to the first half of 1976 is 100 percent.


For Langley, the mean injury period was at a minimum in 1971, at about 20


work days. Itrose to a maximum of 32.5 days in the latter half of 1973


and the first half of 1974 and it has been declining since that time. It


now appears-to be relatively constant at about 24 days.
 

Itmay be noted that in terms of magnitude the Langley injury number


rate and the mean injury period are both at least twice as large as those


at Goddard. This presumably is a reflection of differences innature of the


work at the two centers.


Fig, VI-5through 7,which follow, present images of the injury data 
triplets, (Gl' G2, Z3 ). the accident cause factors., These are, res­
pectively, improper environment, improper behavior, and other and gen­
erally-correspond to the more common factors, unsafe mechanical condition,

unsafe act, and act of God. Interms of safety performance, cause factors

may be ambiguous. In this regard, the product No x G has more meaning,

so we will examine itwhen it seems appropriate.


Fige VI-5shows improper environment, G, for both Goddard and Langley.


This appears to be a small causal factor, presently below 0.10 for both


centers. The Goddard G1 factor has declined from 0.10 for the first


half of 1971 to 0.08 for the first half of 1976. The Langley G1 factor


has declined during the same overall period from 0.10 to 0.06.
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Fi§.VI-6 shows improper behavior, "2 for both centers. The two


functions are quite similar. Each one has a maximum, the Goddard G2 in 1974


and the Langley G2 in the Tatter half of 1973 and the first half of


1974. At Goddard the factor reached 0.69 and at Langley itreached 0.40.


Fig. VI-7 shows acts of God, G, for both centers. Here the similarity 
between the two functions also are high. For Goddard, this factor increased 
from a minimum of 0.22 in the first half of 1974 to 0.48 in the first half 
of 1976, an increase of 109 percent. For Langley, this factor increased 

from a minimum of 0.52 inthe first half of 1974 to 0.66 in the first 

half of 1976, an increase of 27 per cent. To see whether the G3 is 

misleading, let us look at the product No x G For Goddard, the product 

was 1.36 inthe first half of 1974 and it had increased to 3.25 in the


first half of 1976. For Langley, the product was 3.84 in the first half


of 1974 and it had increased to 5.88 in the first half of 1976.


2.3 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS


The analytically defensible conclusions which we have derived from


the injury data for the two NASA centers studied are as follows:


Goddard Space Flight Center


1. The number rate of injury producing accidents is increasing, although


probably not nearly as rapidly as the immediate raw data indicates.


2. The mean lost-time period per injury is also increasing, although


probably not nearly as rapidly as the immediate raw data indicates.


3. The fraction of injury producing accidents which are due to improper


work environment, viz., unsafe mechanical conditions, is low.


4. The fraction of injury producing accidents which are ascribed to what


are commonly called acts of God have increased markedly, by a factor


of two in the last two years.
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Langley Research Center


1. The number rate of injury producing accidents is increasing, although


probably not nearly as rapidly as the immediate raw data indicates.


2. 	 The mean lost-time period per injury is stable and appears to be


declining slightly. This parameter, however, has had a history


at Langley of being high.


3. 	 The fraction of injury producing accidents which are due to improper


work environment, viz., unsafe mechanical conditions, is low and over


the years has shown a steady decline.


4. 	 The fraction of injury producing accidents which are ascribed to


what are commonly called acts of God have increased markedly in the


last two years.
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VI-3 	 EXPLORATION OF SPECIAL FACTORS


Because of the real auto-correlated trends in "Act of God"-type


accidents uncovered at Langley and Goddard inSection VI-2 above and the


significance of these accidents to NASA overall "charge-back" losses in


the near term, itwas determined by WAI that a particular investigation


of this type of accident should be undertaken during the course of this


study to develop in-depth information on the specific causes of these
 

trends.


3.1 	 BACKGROUND


In 1974 the Federal government instituted a new employee protection


program which provided additional 45-day salary continuance protection


for those workers injured in legitimate industrial accidents while on


the job. The concept of the program was aimed at conserving for the


employee his original accumulated "sick-leave" and "vacation" time if


he were hurt in an accident associated with his job.


This separated for the first time the use of his sick-leave for


legitimate off-the-job injuries and illnesses,while those caused by the


work environment would be compensated for separately by what has become


known at NASA as the "C.O.P." (continuation of pay) program.


InJuly, 1976 overall government statistics had shown a tripling


of injury claims by Federal employees since the initiation of the C.O.P.


program inmid-1974.


The chairman of the House group investigating the government's


injury compensation program charged that it has turned into another 
"fringe" vacation and cash benefit for Federal and postal workers,


through fraud and deception on the part of employees and lax administration


by Labor's Office of Workers' Compensation Programs.


On July 24, 1976, the House Government Operations Manpower and


Housing subcommittee wound up its investigative hearings on the program,


and Rep. Floyd Hicks, D-Washington, asserted that government employees


are faking or exaggerating on-the-job illnesses to get paid time off


to "go fishing" or engage in other leisure tasks or even business pursuits.


Hicks accused the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs of "taking


the easy way out" in these cases and approving most of them regardless


of the merits of each case.
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Hicks and his subcommittee colleagues said that not only is the 
program rapidly increasing in cost -- last year's cost was close to a 
half-billion dollars -- but that it is lowering morale among conscientious 
government workers who watch their colleagues get away with undeserved 
paid time off and cash injury compensation awards. 
John C. Read, assistant secretary of labor for employment standards,


and Herbert A. Doyle, Jr., director of the compensation program, testified


there are "serious problems". (Ref. No. 24)


Based on the general investigations of this problem going on in


House of Representatives' Hearings, WAI chose to investigate in-depth


the nature of the lost time accidents at NASA by doing an in-depth workup


on one of our designated centers, LRC.


3.2 NASA LRC LOST TIME AND C.O.P. ANALYSIS


3.2.1 LOST TIME


Lost time days at LRC havemushroomed in 1976 versus 1975 and 1974,


but the number of lost time incidents have not markedly changed, i.e.,


1973 = 21, 1974 = 12, 1975 = 17 and 1976 = 28. Between 1974 and 1976,


lost time incidents have about doubled but C.O.P. incidents based on 1976


records through mid-July have gone up by a factor of 3, based on a com­

parison of all of 1975 to six months of 1976. Similar trends are appearing


at GSFC.


For example: Nature of Lost Time accidents at Langley from 1973


through 1975 isquite interesting as shown in Table V-3.


Table VI-3Chronology of Lost Time


Accidents and Severity at LRC


1973 1974 1975 Totals 
Body Part Inc. D.L.* Inc. D.L. Inc. D.L. Inc. D.L. 
Back 7 288 5 92 4 99 16 429 
Legs/Foot 5 133 2 102 5 33 12 268 
Eye 1 5 0 0 1 11 2 '16 
Nose/Face 1 136 0 0 1 15 2 151 
Arms 1 2 0 0 2 16 3 18 
*D.L. = Days Lost 
Inc. = Incidents 
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Table V-3 (continued)


Hands 5 338* 1 69* 3 34 9 141 
Groin 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 17 
Hip 0 0 1 276 0 0 1 276 
Skull/Head 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
Neck 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lungs 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Hernia 0 0 1 68 0 0 1 68 
Pinched Nerve 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 31 
21 902 12 608 17 158 50 1417 real days 
(1936 paid days) 
Incidents (Inc.)


Days Lost (D.L.)


* 	 One amputation (awarded equivalent of 289 days compensation but was 
absent from work only 16 days) 
Back problems stemming from incorrect lifting, accidental muscle


pulls, stooping for long periods over a work table or low file cabinet


are the most serious.


Second are leg and foot injuries from dropping items being lifted


or carried and from slips, trips, falls and jumps. These represent pre­

liminarily 56% of the lost time incidents and 50% of the lost time and


they are of such a nature that they cannot be reduced by direct guarding


of equipment or warning actions of signs but must be approached through


a direct person-to-person education basis as well as a change inoperational


standards around the center.


For example:


Procure and make mandatory for lab, shop and office personnel


training programs and posters on how to correctly move heavy


objects and how to bend and stoop safely for long periods if


work requires it.


Tag all equipment with a small color label to show everyone if


it can be safely moved by an individual or needs a dollyor


maintenance crew, etc. to move it.
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A directive not to pick up bulk objects by oneself especially


if it has no handholds, etc.


The next set of injuries are to the hands (18% frequency and 10%


of lost time) which shows that the expected injuries in an R&D/fabrication


center are not necessarily correct. People seem to be using their equip­

ment in a proper manner. Careless use of hand tools seems to•be pre­

dominantly the cause here and again it is a human problem, not necessarily


the equipment. Although very expensive centrifugal guard equipment


could be purchased, itreally isnotnecessary ifworkers stay alert to ­
what they are doing. Backing into tools that are winding down or trying 
to stop the wheels by hand are evident here. 
The balance of the lost time adds up to only 24% in frequency


and 40% in actual lost time days with the largest of these being injuries


to the eye,nose, face (9%frequency and 12% lost time). Hip injuries


are rare but are associated with long lost time claims.


Accidents associated with advanced age (over 50, work force) like


broken bones from a fall, trips and falls on stairs, etc. do not seem


to be evident at Langley although we expected them. Itis the younger


blue collar worker in the more active pushing, lifting, climbing situations


that contribute to the major lost times.


3.2.2 	 C.O.P. TIME ANALYSIS


There isno question that the data reviewed to date from LRC


and GSFC shows a significant increase inC.O.P. time. Just why this is


happening when the increase,in the number of lost time accidents at those


centers is significantly less than the increase in apparent severity


(real days lost) must be evaluated. There are really two sources of


key information that were tapped to get answers to this' question.


The first, of course, is the administrators of the safety,


health and personnel offices at the centers, and a dialogue was estab­

lished with these offices during the course of this study.


The second is the people who have been claiming lost time. Our


objective here was to try and determine whether the lost time claim is


completely legitimate or not, and if not, what changes in the administration


of the new Federal Government Employee Injury Compensation Law enacted
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in1974 should be undertaken at NASA to tighten up the evaluation of


claims 'so that the ratio of legitimate claims over the total time of the


claimed injury can be maximized.


The method used to gather this information was to choose one


NASA center of the three that were contracted to be evaluated in this


contract and work with that center's "Office of Health and Safety" to develor


administrative and employee non-personal questionnaires that could develop


the in-depth information required. NASA-LRC was chosen as the representa­

tive center and a detailed questionnaire was distributed to all NASA-LRC


employees that reported C.O.P. fnjuries from 1974 through 1976. The


questionnaires were designed by WAI and modified by NASA-LRC administra­

tive personnel to the specific climate of the center.


The questionnaire was designed to determine how C.O.P. time is


assigned, whether it is voluntary or specified by the center, whether


the length of time taken is legitimate relative to the injury,who determines


when the employee returns to work, etc.


The following discussion highlights the questionnaires and the


results of their evaluationby WAI.
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Langley Research Center 
Hampton, Virginia 
*23665 
Fig. VI-8 
Reply lo Ali of Octobei 14, 1976 
-MEMORANDUM.


'-TO: >. 'Distribution 
A FROM: 114/Vice Chairman, Executive Safety Board 
",SUBJECT: Lost Time Accident Data " I . 
NASA Headquarters is conducting a study at selected fieid installations
of lost time accidents. As a part of that effort, we have been asked 
to solicit from employees who have had lost time accidents the infor­
mation shown on the enclosed questionnaire. 
. 
As you will see, the questionnaire is general in natureand completelyprotects the identity of those responding. Specifically, you'are requested
not to sign the questionnaire. 
"


Please complete the enclosed form and return it to M/S 114 by'October 29, 1976. Your participation is voluntary, but this 'office' 
requests your support. 
Walter C.Hogj ,\


2411


Enclosure.,. ­
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Fig. 	 VI-9 
TYPICAL


A DMINISTRATTVE-UJES TIONNA IRE 
NASA Safety, Health & Personnel Offices 
The 	objective of this questionnaire is to relate (1) lo-st tim'e and (Z)lost 
tu-ne charges to (a) the means by which medical treatment is supplied to 
and (b) the administrative procedures followed regarding injured employees. 
1. 	 What methods do you use to determine the employee's severity and­
prognosis of injury9 
0 Outside doctor report Until October 1, 1976, outside Dr. 	was used 

0. NASA or NASA contractor doctor report 
Effective October 1, 1976, Contract Physicians on Site 
0 Personal judgements at the time


0 None of the above. Describe method used.


2.., As a matter of administrative procedure 
0 Are employees briefed when hired as to their medical and lost 
time benefits? 
Yes


0 Is'an injured employee briefed at the time of his first report or 
after? 
Yes


Is Cotitinuation of Pay (C.0. P.) automatic? 
Optional 
- Choice of C.O.P./A.L./S.L.


AA 
3. 	 After initial report, is employee briefed at his request or as a 
matter of Center policy? 
Center 	 Policy - Briefed by Nurse in Attendance 
4. 	 Do safety, medical, or,personnel administration employees make the 
'decision on whether an injured employee is briefed on C. 0. P. at the 
time of or after an injury? 
Medical employees render the decision at the time injury is repdrted


5. ',,Did NASA medical office or physicians follow up on independent medical 
exams or opinions on the employee with major C. 0. P. claims, i.e., 
were claims medically verified during lost time period?* 
Medical substantiation is required before employee is given C.O.P.


For the period January 1974 through A-it 1976, for lost time accidents, 
please list: 
6. 	 Lost Time (days) 14 'El 
7. 	 Diagnostic Physician/Treating Physician 
7. 1 Government Employee 
7. 2 Government Contractor 
Government contractor and referred physicians


7.3 	 Private


Some employees elected private physician
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8. -IProcedure Regarding' Lost Time Charges 
8. 	 1 Was the employee given or did he have any option as to how 
his lost time was charged? 
Yes (see 2) 
8. 	 2 Was he aware that he had an option, if he did, as to how his 
lost time was charged? 
.Yes 
8. 	 3 Who informed the employee regarding the foregoing and when was 
he informed, prior to being injured, immediately after the injury, 
or upon return to work? 
Nurse in attendance 
- at the time injury was reported 
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Fig. VI-10 
TYPICAL


NASA EMPLOYEE - WORK INJURY


QUESTIONNAIRE


We do not want your name. If you had more than one injury, fill out a 
separate questionnaire for each. 
1.. What yearIdid your injury occur? 
/Ci 75


2. Were you out more than one time for this injury? How many working 
days for each time? 
c/ln' e-AC -
3. 	 flowv was the lost time charged; sick leave, "45 day Continuation of 
Pay Plaii", leave without pay, vacation? 
4. 	 Where did the injury occur, i.e., work place, home, etc. ? 
5. 	 Time of day? Type of injury? Was it treated at the Center? 
c ," Ib, oKr1 ,> -. 'ai~sf 
6. 	 What happeed immediately after your injury? 
6. 	 1 When did you report the accident to your supervisor or to the 
safety or medical office? 
(,./I-Dt.
,..
/ .Y 
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6. Z' 'What did your doctor advise you to do About your injury? 
6.3 	 Did you give a yerbal or written report to NASA on the day of 
the accident? 
- V EZ 	 C--'.,4K 


6.4 	 What were you told to do by NASA safety, health or administrative 
personnel regarding your accident, injury and claims? 
'7. 	 Was oral, or written information given to you about your available injury, 
sick time and/or continuation of pay benefits on the day you were injured? 
During the week you were injured? Later than that? 
8. 	 How, was this information given to you? 
Orally , 
Written ,._" 
9.' If oral, what office or union at the Center gave you the information? 
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10. If written, what office at the Center gave you the information? 
11. 	 Were you given a choice as to how your lost time was to be charged? 
12. 	 Were.you cared for by a NASA doctor, a NASA contract doctor or a 
private doctor? 
13. 	 Do you feel you had adequate time to recover from your injury? 
14. 	 Did your physician specify the time at which you should return to work? 
15.. 	 Did you return to work prior to or later than the physician had 
recommended? Why? 
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3.2.3 EVALUATION OF LRC -- C.O.P. WORK INJURIES QUESTIONNAIRES


The results from the NASA employee work injury questionnaire


resulted in 33 detailed responses which were broken down as 23 in 1976,


4 in 1975 and 1 each for the years 1973, 1972 and 1971.


Of the 1976 responses, 15 out of the 26 represented C.O.P.


time inexcess of 1 day. Table VI-4 shows the detailed breakdown of all


the cases returned with the questionnaire.


The basic characteristics of this data show the following trends.


I. The majority of all time charged isC.O.P. but there were


some "sick leave" charges.


2. Most accidents from questionnaire reply were minor lost


times and are broken down as shown below.


Reported 1976 Lost


Time Days No. of Incidents


25 1 
16 1 
7 1 
4 .1 
3.5 1 
3 6 
2.5 1 
2 3 
0.5 8 
Totals 63.5 23 
3. The causes of the reported C.O.P. injuries appear to be in


two categories, unsafe acts on the part of the employee or


acts of God.


The actual distribution being 32% unsafe acts, 59%


acts of God and 9% unsafe conditions or mechanical failures


of equipment.


This indicates that the safety programs at LRC are


indeed working well and that the majority of lost time injuries


are in categories of personel carelessness or accidents that


are caused by an uncontrollable set of random events.
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WRrfODUCIBILITYTABLE VI-4 RIINAL P&GE IS10',O, 
EVALUATION MATRIX OF NASA-LRC EMPLOYEE QUESTIONNAIRE 
2 3 4 

TIME LOST-DAYS/QUARTERLY PERIOD HOW CHARGED LOCATION 

COP AL NONE OF ACCIDENTf
Yr of Injury 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 

1 1976 12.5 3.5 X @ Work on 
Stairwav 
2 @ work , 
3 "2 5 _ _ _ _ _ _ X _ _ _ _ _ _ _ "_ 
4 x­
4 " 1 1 1 X _ _ _ _ _ _ ,l__ ---­"_____ 
5 1/2 (To Go To Dr.) X

6 1/2 X

7 1/2 X

8 1/2 X

9 1/2 X

10 2 
 X
 
11 3 
 X
 
12 3 X

13 	 1.5 1/2 
 X(CODE
 
14 "U 
 x "

15 1 3 X

16 	 1.5 1 1 X

17 7 
 X
 
18 1/2 X

19 2 X
 
20 1/2 1/8 X 
21 	 3 X " 
22 	 3 x
 
23 	 0 
24 2 1/2 X 
25 2 1/2 1/2 X 
26 1/2 X 
27 1975 (SEVERAL) 115 14 
28 
 x 	 @ Work
 
29 9 
 X "i
 
30 1/2 
 x

31 1973 5 5 
 X
 
32 1972 3 Leave W/O

S1971 	 1/2 
Ff 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
Table VI-4 (cont'd)


5 6 
 7


TYPE OF ACCIDENT BODY PART & INJURY DOCTOR


Unsafe Unsafe Mech. HISTORY Pri. NA A AF Other


Act Cond. Fail. A.G.


1 X LEG-Sprained Ankle Contact X


Pulled tendons & lic.


2 X Treated on scene/NASA


nurse-BACK - STRAINED x
3 -X


4 X LEG


X Back X


6 X Finger - Cut 
 X


7 X x Hand - Stitches X


8 X Eye - Chem Burn X


9 X Eye - Chem Burn X


X Ribs - Fractured in X


Fall


11 x Back - Strain X


12 X Arms, Back X


13 - Eye X


14 Broken Arm X


X Back - Strain X


16 x Ankle - Sprain X


17 X Back - Strain XI


-x Hand-cut, Stitches X


Yg 19 X Finger cut X


A X Elbow - Contusion


21 Eyes - U.V. Buhns X


22 x Muscle Strain-[eg X


23 X Head X


24 X Knee - twisted X


X Elbow & Neck Strain X X


26 Finger - Cut off end X


27 Back - Slipped Disc- X


Req. surgery


Finger - Broken X.


3 X Shoulder - Pulled 
 
28 - - -Foot - Fracture X


Z9 X -saw Cut -Ektremity X ,


X


Muscle


32nW x Hand-Abrasions/Sander I


33 X Finger Cut - Stitches
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Table VI-4 (cont'd) ,,


8I 9 O10 1I 12 
INSTRUCTIONS ON WHO DIR. EMPLOYEE AS ADEQUATE TIME RETURN TO 
DOCTORS ADVICE CHARGES TO LOST TIME CHGS. TO RECOVER WORK DE IS. 
Employee NASA NASA Uniohl Other Yes No Employ- Phy 
Choice Directed Nurse ee 
u 1 Stay off foot-
Use crutches X X X X 
2 Rest and take X Health X X 
Medicine FSS? X 
3 X X X 
4 Go home, stay in X X X 
bed - take med. 
5 Get x-ray
Light duty
J 6 Keep dry- don't 
X 
X XX 
Safety 
Office 
X X 
bend finger 
i 7 Stitches + X X 
bandage 
t 8 Minor burn -no treatment X X X 
9 Minor - drops X X X 
onlv 
10 Stay home 
2 days 
X r. Tim 
Clerk X X 
pi 11 
12 
Lay on flat 
surface 
Exercise 
X X 
No ne 
x 
X X 
i 13 Soak with cold X X 
water, take med. 
14 Taken to No One X -
i 
15 
Hospital 
Rest - Pills T_ f rX 
Prior 
i 16 
17 
Stay in bed 5 days 
Stay off leg 2 wks. 
Bed Rest X 
X X­
-r - r 
UPrior 
! 18 Keep hand dry X XX 
19 Sent back to work X Branch X X 
3p­
772W 
same day 
Rest arm ­ no 
time off
-Rest eyes -
X 
_" 
Sec. 
Safety 
OfficeSupr. 
X 
X 
X 
X 
bandaged 
I 
T2 
Uf STay OTT leg Tor 
several days 
Kest­ 12 hours 
__ 
X 
- XX 
-r 
• x 
• g - XX 
Another observation on the questionnaires from LRC can


be highlighted by comparison between the lost time injuries


reported by questionnaires from 1972-1976 and thetst time


injuries reported by NASA Form #344 compiled directly from manda­

tory accident reports required by'OSHA in this same period.


Comparison of the official data with the voluntary


returns of the questionnaires show that 55 disabling injuries


yielding lost time greater than one day occurred at LRC from


January, 1974 through June, 1976, while the return of the voluntary


questionnaires only show 18.


Therefore, about 67% of the people injured during thi


period and who received the questionnaire from the Health and


Safety Office did not return it.


While no conclusions as to the causation of major lost


time incidents and C.O.P. injuries can be reached from this fact,


the lack of cooperation may be indicative of a general attitude


-contributing to abuse of C.O.P. privileges.


Most important also is that no responses were received


by questionnaire from the majority of the major lost time (10 days


or more) claimants during the 1974 through 1976 period, since the


C.O.P. plan has been in effect.
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VI-4 NASA ON-SITE CONTRACTOR DATA ANALYSIS


Based upon -the requirements of the NASW-2903 contractual statement of


work WAI interviewed three NASA on-site service contractors in order to obtain


an idea of their accident and injury experience from the year 1972 through the


first half of 1976.


It was felt that this data might provide a comparison between government


and private operations in similar environments.


To this end data was obtained at NASA LRC from the Klate-Holt Co. and


the Metro Services Co.,on-site contractors. For NASA GSFC data were obtained


from the Bendix-Field Engineering Corp. NASA-HQ does not have any major services


contractors -augmenting staff operations at this center.


42I THE NATURE OF THE CONTRACTOR'S WORK


4.1.1 	 KLATE-HOLT CO.


The Klate-Holt Co. is engaged in providing general transportation


services 	 to the NASA LRC facility in the following areas:


Heavy and light truck operations


Hauling


Warehousing


Furniture & equipment packing and moving


Forklift operations


Mail and taxi service


4.1.2 	 METRO CONTRACT SERVICES, INC.


Metro Contract Services, Inc. is engaged in providing general construction


and maintenance services to the NASA LRC facility in the following areas:


Heavy duty 	 rigging operations


Road service


Equipment maintenance and repair


Carpentry


Electrical 	 work


Plumbing & 	 painting


General 	 laborer services


Roofing


Truck & 	 light vehicle operations to support above.


Unfortunately, Metro has been keeping records on accident and injury for only one


year since its contract began hence chronological comparisons with this contractor


were not felt to be statistically meaningful.
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4.1.3 	 BENDIX FIELD ENGINEERING CORP.


Bendix Field Engineering Corp. is primarily engaged in engineering and


operational support of GSFC's worldwide tracking station network. They provide


these services on-site at the following locations:


Goldstone, Calif.


NASA GSFC, Md.


Merritt Island


Kokee Park


4.2 RESULTS OF CONTRACTOR DATA ANALYSIS


Tables VI-5A and VI-5B show injury frequency and severity data for Klate-

Holt and Bendix employees along with the corresponding data for government


employees at Langley and Goddard, respectively. The contractor data in each of


the two 	tables is consistent with the nature of the work they do.


Both the frequency and severity for the Klate-Holt operation have been


and are higher than the values for government employees at Langley. The Klate-

Holt injury frequency, for the first-half of 1976, is about 3 injuries per 200,000


man hours as compared to about 0.8 injuries per 200,000 man hours for Langley


government workers. The Klate-Holt injury severity for the first half of 1976,


is 180 man days per million man hours as compared to 40 man days per million man


hours. Since the Klate-Holt operation is inherently more physical than typical


Langley operations, the Klate-Holt data should not be surprising. The Klate-

Holt injury frequency is approximately that of American industry as a whole


for 1975 (i.e., 2.62). The Klate-Holt frequency shows an increase during the


reporting period; the severity rate is essentially constant. The data has been


autocorrelated.


On the other hand, one might expect that Bendix employees and the government


employees at Goddard would be exposed to about the same hazards the same fraction


of the time because both the calibre of employee and their job assignments are


comparable. The frequency of injury for Bendix employees is about the same as


it is for government employees at Goddard, although it is consistently somewhat


lower. The Bendix injury frequency, for the first half of 1976, is 0.49


injuries per 200,000 man hours as compared to 0.67 injuries per 200,000 man hours


for Goddard government workers. The Bendix injury severity, by comparison, tends


to be significantly lower than that for Goddard government employees. For the


first half of 1976, the respective values were 17.8 and 44.8 man days lost per


million man hours. This, again; isautocorrelated data.
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TABLE VI-5A Klate-Holt Frequency & Severity Data


F-
K-H K-H NASA K-H SEVERITY NASA


19KT HOURS # o--LOST NURY F- T S


YR WORKED TIME ACC. FREQ LRC D.L. KH LRC


1972 6.04x10 5 2 1.6 .63 78 200 55


1973 2.46xi0 5 3 2.1 .60 69 210 61


1974 2.24x105 3 2.4 .55 36 180 66


1975 2.34xi0 5 2 2.7 .64 24 160 49


1976** 1.37xi0 5 4 3.2 .82 40 180 50


TABLE VI-5B Bendix Field Engineering Freq. & Severity Data


BENDIX BENDIX F B NASA BENDIX SEVERITY NASA 
fANHOURS W of-LOST INJURY Tf S 
YR WORKED TIME ACC. FREQ. GSFC D.L. GSFC 
1972 4.48x106 3 .21 .37 19 6.8 16.6


1973 5.47x106 6 0.28 0.45 42 9.6 1469


1974 5.47x]0 6 II 0.39 0.52 77 14.2 16.5


1975 5.14x106 17 0.49 0.57 145 18.5 27.3


1976** 2.41x106 5 0.49 0.67 18 17.8 44.8


Where: F = frequency = LOST TIME accidents per 200,000 man hrs worked


D.L. = Days Lost 
S = Severity = Days Lost per 1,000,000 man hrs. worked 
** : Data through the 2nd quarter of the year, K-H and Bendix, 
through August of the Year, LRC and GSFC


K-H = Klate-Holt


Autocorrelation coefficient = I year
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Table VI-7 (con't


Summary of GSFC Property Damge History

1972 -176


NASA 	 Total $K Identification of Accident
Facility Character of Accident 	 Corrective
Type Yr No. Costs or Equipment Involved 
 Cause 
 Actions


Fire 
 I 	 1976* 17 $ 2.7K 
1975 23 $ 5.8K Large No. of small fires 
that 	 were controlled oc­

cured in 1975 at GSFC &


its Tracking Stations


1974 20 $ 0.58K [1 ,, 
1973 1 $ 5K Goldstone fire in Unknown


vacated room
Fire 	 in old transformer
1 Ageing Inspection &


1 2K Trailer Fire Replacement
Electric heater 
 Turn 	off heaters


on when trailer when trailers


unattended. 
 not in use


19 Small mishap fires 	 Trash cans,


Short Circuits,


1972 38 " Auto, fires etc.


Totals 
 120 20K


GSFC Explosion or Pressure 
 A, B 1975 0 ­

-Vessel Failure 
 & I 
1974 0 ­
1973 0 ­
1972 0 -
Totals 
 0 0


GSFC Collisions (Non-
 A&B 	 1976*
Aircraft) Govt.		 15 4.2
 Failure to maintain
Vehicle 	 Improper Veh. Accident


= 0 Control 	 Action by Freq. Rate Per
as 
 
Driver 
 106 Miles


shown 	 b.55 (i 7j

1975 32 9.8 Auto 	 12 
 19 5.9


Table VI-7 (cont) 
Summary of GSFC Property Damage History
 

*
1972 - 1976
 
NASA Total $K Identification of Accident Corrective


Facility Character of Accident Type Yr No. Costs or Equipment Involved Cause Actions


Misc. &/or Prime 1973 1 3.0 Contractor dropped


Function Related Load test


1972 1 3.0 Antenna tower collasped


Total 13 21.3


CO.


pressure vessel operations which includes structural analysis, x-ray


inspection and hydro and pneumatic testing according to ASME codes.


GOVERNMENT VEHICLE LOSS


From 1972 through the third quarter of 1976 no Type A or Type B losses


have occurred from the operation of government vehicles. Hoyever, during


this same period 19 type I accidents occurred yielding a total loss of


$3221.00. More significant, however, is the major increase in the accident


frequency rate per 106 miles driven at LRC. This index has increased from


zero in 1972 and 1973 to 18.6 in 1975 and 18.9 through the third quarter of 1976.


This is almost three times the national average of 6.66 for the same period and


indicates that a major driving safety program should be undertaken by the


Office of Health and Safety at LRC to reduce the government auto accident rate


before it rises any further.


5.3 SUMMARY OF NASA HQ PROPERTY DAMAGE PROFILE


No major property damage in any category has been recorded occurring at


NASA HQ from 1972 through the third quarter of 1976 except one auto accident in


1974 that resulted in $944.00 of property damage. This yields an average auto


accident frequency rate of 2.15 for the period 1972 through the third quarter


of 1976 which is about one-third of the national average during the same period.
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V3 :GRAPHICAL 
COMPARISONS


VII. GRAPHICAL COMPARISONS OF NASA VS GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY


The approach to setting safety comparisons between NASA and


other elements oFthe government and private sector can only be mean­

inful if the elements of comparison are of the same or similar set.


Therefore, looking at NASA safety records in comparison with the


coal mine industry, while making NASA look good by comparison, is


not a proper comparison because the nature of the operations inboth


organizations are completely different.


It was, therefore, determined that the only way to evaluate the


relative effectiveness of NASA's present health and safety programs


was to compare NASA with only those other government and private


organizations that had the same or similar function, employed the same


or similar types of spersonnel, and, where possible, were organized


in a similar fashion.


Two basic groups of organizations were identified as meaningful


comparisons with NASA. They are the National Laboratory Complex of


ERDA and R&D portions of the aerospace industry.


The ERDA laboratories fill the same type of function for ERDA


as NASA centers do for NASA; that is,they are advanced technology,


development and research centers employing high level scientists, engineers


and skilled technicians engaged in directed research towards national


scientific policy goals. Their capabilities cover the entire gamut


of analytical research and concept formulation through design, fabrication,


assembly and full scale testing of prototype systems.


The only difference between ERDA and NASA is that all ERDA labs


are staffed and run by private contractor organizations. These contractors,


however, are very similar to government in how they organize, how they


administer and in the type of people employed. Universities like University


of California, Columbia and University of Chicago and corporations


like Union Carbide are typical of the private contractors running these


labs. ERDA was chosen specifically to explore the reasons for any


major differences in contractor vs government administration of similar


operations.


In order to assess the effect of well run profit making organizational


methods on safety, classical comparisons with various elements of the


aerospace industry were made. Since these contractors play a major


part in helping NASA fulfill its program goals and there is a constant


interchange of ideas, methods and personnel between the two types of


75


,C-p1 PG4_BLANr,_NtAM 
Electronics (cont'd)


Hughes Aircraft, Fullerton, Calif.


Research & Development (Private)


Atomics International, Los Angeles, Calif.


General Atomics, San Diego, Calif.


Hughes Research Labs, Malibu, Calif.


Hercules-Allegheny Ballistics Labs, Md.


Martin-Marietta, Vandenberg, Calif.


Aeroneutronics - Philco, Los Angeles, California


Hughes Aircraft, Canoga Park, Calif.


Martin-Marietta, Cape Canaveral, Fla.


Lockheed Missiles & Space, Vandenberg, Calif.


Chrysler Corp., Huntsville, Ala.


Hughes Space Comm., Los Angeles, Calif.


Hughes Aircraft, Culver City, Calif.


Lockheed Missiles & Space, Huntsville, Ala.


Martin-Marietta, Michoud, Ala.


Tables VII-1 through VII-3 show the Z16.1 or OSHA reported and


autocorrelated valuesof injury frequency and severity data computed


for all the government and private industries listed above. Table


VII-4 details a comparison of 'average severity rates from 1972 - 1976


for pertinent government agencies and industries vs NASA.


Fig. VII-l summarizes NASA Images of Autocorrelated Injury Frequency


and Severity data obtained during this study. It is evident that


since 1973 NASA injury frequency has been increasing linearly at the


rate of .085 injuries per 200,000 man hours worked/year, or by a


factor of approximately 33% per year. GSFC and Headquarters roughly


approximate the total agency rate increase through this period, however,


LRC has been dropping from 1971 to 1974 and then markedly reverses


its trend to a slightly larger slope than the total agencies from


1974 through 1976.


During the same period, however, although the autocorrelated accident


frequency is increasing the autocorrelated severity for the entire


NASA shows a marked decrease of almost 64% from 1972 - 1976. This


cross reversal between frequency and severity trends associated with


NASA occupational injuries is quite significant and indicates that
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Table VII-1 NASA Injury Data


VII-lA *Frequency - Injuries/200,000 Man Hours


Year 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976


(thru Aug.).


GSFC 	 0.33 0.24 0.44 0.55 0.44 1.16


(.35) (.37) (.45) (.52) (.57) (.67);


LRC 	 0.66 0.56 0.63 0.35 0.52 1.5&


(.67) (.63) (.60) (.55) (.64) (.82)


HQ 	 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.19 0.29 0.34


(.06) (.07) (.11) (.18) (.24) (.28)


All NASA 	 0.30 0.30 0.37 0.49 0.54 0.73


(.33) (.35) (.40) (.47) (.53) (.57)


VII-IB *Severity - Man Days Lost/Million Man Hours


Year 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976


GSFC 15.8 17.4 6.0 7.9 16.7 103.5


(17.5) (16.0) (14.9) (16.5) (27.3) (44.8) 
LRC 	 100.0 21.7 163.4 95.7 3.7 94.9


(72) (55) (61) (66) (49) (50)


HQ **378 2.0 -- 2.0 5.4 5.3


(2.2) (2.4) (3.0) (4.1) (4.7)


All NASA 59.0 270 **917 62.2 44.9 38.6


(115) (137) (95) (68) (55) (50)


*Injuries counted relate to time lost from work. Autocorrelated data are in


parenthesis. Autocorrelation was taken at 6-mo intervals with autocorrelation


coefficient of 1 year.


**Omitted from autocorrelation as not a proper member of the data set.


78


Table Vll-2 ERDA Injury Data


VII-2A *Frequency Lost Time Injuries/200,O00 Man Hours


Year 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
(thru June) 
ORNL 0.12 0.28 0.24 0.27 0.79 0.65 
(Union 
Carbide) 
(.20) (.25) (.30) (.39) (.57) (.63) 
BNL 0.45 0.53 .67 ..... 1.12 
(Columbia U) (.54) (.63) (.81) (1.07) (1.19) (.201 
LLL 0.19 0.19 0.13 0.33 0.85 1.54­(Uof Calif) (.23) (.24) (.29) (.46) (.75) (.98) 
ANL 0.41 0.30 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.174 (Uof 
Chicago) 
(.35) (.31) (.29) (.28) (.28) (.26) 
LASL 0.31 0.43 0.33 0.40 0.51 0.62 (Uof Calif) (.36) (.39) (.39) (.42) (.48) (.51) 
Average 0.30 0.33 0.33 0.26 1.01 0.82 
of Above (.34) (.36) (.42) (.52) (.65) (.72) 
VII-2B *Severity - Man Days Lost/Million Man Hours 
Year 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
(thru June) 
ORNL 298 52 23 23 16.5 4.0 
(188) (105) (54) (34) (24) (19'2) 
BNL 85 76 60 9 73 96 
(80) (72) (58) (47) (59) (70) 
LLL 5 20 152 21 26 42 
(25) (46) (69) (51) (37) (36) 
ANL 70 29 **1624 15 32 11.4 
(51) (37) (27) (23) (25) (24) 
LASL **744 55 39 **650 26 36 
(52) (49) (42) (36) (31) (31) 
Average (79) (62) (50) (38) (35) (36) 
of Above 
*Autocorrelated data are in parenthesis. Autocorrelation was taken at 6-mo intervals


with autocorrelation coefficient of 1 year.


**Omitted from autocorrelation as not a proper member of the data set.
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Table VII-3A Aerospace Industry Injury, 
Frequency Data 
*Lost Time Injuries/200,000 Man Hours 
Year 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Air Frame 0.37 0.44 0.38 0.26 0.28 0.39 
(.39) (.39) (.36), (.32) (.31) (.32) 
Engine 0.70 0.52 0.66 0.49 0.49 0.48 
(.63) (.59) (.58) (.54) (.51) (.50), 
Electronics 0.25 0.29 0.26 0.30 0.37 0.25 
((.26) (.27) (.28) (.30) (.32) (.32) 
R&D 0.16 0.32 0.16 0.25 0.36 0.39 
(.22) (.24) (.24 (.26) (.31) (.34) 
All 0.34 0.38 0.34 0.27 0.28 0.38 
Aerospace (.31) (.35) (.33) (.31) (.30) (.31) 
*Autocorrelated data are inparenthesis. Autocorrelation was taken at 6-mo 
intervals with autocorrelation coefficient of 1 year. 
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Table VII-3B. Aerospace Industry Injury Severity Data


(Based on Z16.1 Reports)


Lost Time Days / Million Manhours Worked


Year 1972 1973 1974 1975 4-Yr Average


Air Frame 204 - -182


-
 160


Engine 119 115
1111
III ...... 
 
Electronics .49-61 55


R&D 518 490


9462


Rocket Engine 21 200 Q- ,


Al 216 -2 208


All Aerospace 240
225


. ~~210...z25


Table VII-4 -Comparison of Average Lost-Time Occupational Injury


Severity Rates 
Days Lost Per Million Man Hours Worked 
Rank Agency/Industry Av. Severity Rate 
I All Industry 656 
2 All Aerospace R&D 490 
3 All Aerospace 225 
4 All Fed. Gov't. Civilian 114 
Employees 
5 All NASA 104 
6 LRC 76 
7 GSFC 30 
8 Headquarters 4 
Years


1972-75


1972-75


1972-75


1972-74


1972-76


1972-76


1972-76


1972-76
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114 
more minor accidents of very little consequence to real "loss" are


being reported in recent years. If the same spectrum of real accidents


were maintained as in 1972 and frequency of these accidents increased


at the rate shown in Fig. VII-I then all autocorrelated severity values


would have to increase. The fact that they do not and are markedly


decreased, while the employee population has been reduced during this


same period by 18%, indicates that the literal interpretation of


accident reporting rules imposed by OSHA by NASA Safety Office -admin­

istrative personnel is the most plausible reason for the marked rise


in frequency data that has been reported over the last five years.


While there is no doubt that these injury events are real, they


are not significant to the total loss picture. Severity frequencies


in this case are the significant parameter and do follow the real


trends expected from a drop in agency personnel and a continual up­

grading of industrial safety programs stimulated by both NASA and


OSHA activities over the past five years.


Fig. VII-2 details the accident frequency and severity histogram


of five ERDA R&D centers. The most important observation on this


set of figures compared to Fig. VII-l is that the trends of both the


frequency and severity indices generally match what has been observed


at NASA for the same periods. That is, frequency data shows a definite


upward trend on the ERDA average curve and severity is markedly decreasing


during this same period. Even the absolute magnitude of the average


"Frequency" and "Severity" histories of NASA and the five selected


ERDA laboratories is remarkably similar.


Therefore, Fig. VII-2 yields further corroboration to the sig­

nificance of the change inreporting systems from Zi6.l to OSHA 102 
on the interpretation of real occupational injury "Loss" information. 

Fig. VII-3 shows the autocorrelation images of aerospace industry 

industrial accident frequencies from 1971 - 1976, while Table VII-3B 

shows the available information on average severity for this same period 

in the industry. 

Unlike both NASA and ERDA,frequency and severity profiles in the


aerospace industry for the last five years have been almost constant.


The engine and airframe portions of the industry exhibit a 20 - 25%


drop in frequency and while the electronics and R&D portions of the


- industry compensate by increasing their frequencies by about the same


amount.- It is difficult to specify why this type of a trend is appearing
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7 
without further indepth analysis of this industry. However, it is


felt that both the engine and airframe portions of the aerospace industry


can respond well to the classic OSHA formula for reducing industrial


accidents. The electronics and R&D portions of the industry, however,


experience more unique and constantly changing work environments, processes


and production requirements which are not as easily controlled due to


their transient and new character as the more stereotyped industrial


environment in the engine and airframe part of the business.


Because of the existence of only average values of severity data


over the last five years in this industry, not much can be said about


the trends in real lost time except that they are on the average higher


by a factor of five to six than NASA's and ERDA's and that they have


not changed markedly from 1972 - 1975.


Fig. VII-4 summarizes the relative occupational injury frequency


performance of industry, government, ERDA labs, NASA and the aerospace


industry between 1971 and 1976. Of most significance is the relative


position of NASA to all government and industry. Although NASA has


increased its accidental injury frequency rate during the last several


years, its rate of change as an agency is only about half of the rate


of increase in frequency experienced by all government and all industry.


However, average severities during this same period for NASA are


very close to all of government as shown in Table VII-4 and are about


1/6th those of all American industry, 1/5 of the severities in the


aerospace R&D portion of the aerospace industry and about 1/2 those


found in the total aerospace industry.


Again, the marked increase in all government injury frequency


rates since 1974 ismost probably based on the change-over from Z16.1


to OSHA reportingformats. This momentum is reflected in both the


frequency trends of ERDA and NASA while the aerospace industry stays


about constant reflecting increased safety in the heavy manufacturing


side balanced by poorer performance in the R&D section due to drops in


funding and personnel which foster cheaper operations in a hazardous


experimental environment not inherently protected by tried procedures


and methods as in the volume manufacturing side of the industry.
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Executive Order 11807 and the
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EXECUTIVE ORDER 11807 
Occupational Safety and Health Programs 
for Federal Employees 
As the Nation's largest employer, the Federal Government 
has a special obligation to set an example for all employers by 
providing a safe and healthful working environment for itsemployees. 
mploe. tmaintain 
more than three years, the Federal Government has 
been seeking to carry outOrtheseutiv er o. 161responsibilities underthe erm of Exe s lemn , is ued in 971 andthe terms of Executive Order No. 11612, issued in 1971 and 
based upon the authorities granted by the landmark Occupa­
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970 as well as sectimn 7902(e) of 
title 5, United States Code. 
Considerable progress has been achieved under the 1971 ex­
ecutive order, but it is now clear that even greater efforts are 
needed. It is therefore necessary that a new order be issued, 
reflecting this Nation's firm and renewed commitment to 
provide exemplary working conditions for those devoted to 
public service. 
The provisions bf this order are intended to ensure that each 
agency head is provided with all the guidance necessary to 
carry out an effective occupational safety and health program 
within the agency. Further, to keep the President abreast of 
progress, this order provides for detailed evaluations of the 
agencies' occupational safety and health programs by the 
Secretary of Labor and transmittal of those evaluations, 
together with agency comments, to the President. In addition, 
the Federal Safety Advisory Council on Occupational Safety 
and Health is continued because of its demonstrated value as an 
advisory body to the Secretary of Labor. 
Experience has shown that agency heads desire and need 
more detailed guidance from the Secretary of Labor to make 
their occupational' safety and health programs more effective. 
This, order provides that the Secretary of Labor shall issue 
detailed guidelines and provide such further assistance as the 
agencies may request. 
NOW,THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me 
by section 7902(c) (1) of title 5 of the United States Code, and as 
President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows: 
Scope of This Order 
SECTION 1. For the purposes of this order, the term 
"agency" means an Executive Department, as defined in 5 
U.S.C. 101, or any employing unit or authority of the 
Government of the United States not withd an Executive 
Department. This order applies to all agencies of the Executive 
Branch of the Government: and by agreement between the 
Secretary of Labor (hereinafter referred to as the Secretary) 
and the head of an agency of the Legislative or Judicial 
Branches of the Government, the provisions of this order may 
be made applicable to such agencies. In addition, by agreement 
between the Secretary of Labor and the head of any agency, 
and to the extent permitted by law, the provisions of this order 
may be extended to employees of agencies who are employed in 
geographic locations to which the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1970 is not applicable. 
Duties of Heads of Agencies 
SEC. 2. The head of each agency shall, after consultation, 
with representatives of the employees thereof, establish andihrpeettvso h mpoesteef sals n 
an occupational safety and health program meeting
the requirements of section 19 of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act (hereinafter referred to as the act). In order to 
ensure that agency programs are consistent with the standards 
prescribed by section 6 of the act, the head of each agency shall: 
(1) Designate or appoint, to be responsible for the manage­
ment and administration of the agency occupational safety and 
health program, an agency official with sufficient authority to 
represent effectively the interest and support of the agency 
head. 
(2) Establish an occupational safety and health manage­
ment information system, which shall include the maintenance 
of such records of occupational accidents, injuries, illnesses and 
their causes, and the compilation and transmittal of such 
reports based upon this information, as the Secretary may 
require pursuant to section 3 of this order. 
(3) Establish procedures for the adoption of agency occupa­
tional safety and health standards consistent with the stand­
ards promulgated by the Secretary pursuant to section 6 of the 
act; assure prompt attention to reports by employees or others 
of unsafe or unhealthful working conditions; assure periodic 
inspections of agency workplaces by personnel with sufficient 
technical competence to recognize unsafe and unhealthful 
working conditions in such workplaces; and assure prompt 
abatement of unsafe or unhealthful working conditions, includ­
ing those involving facilities and/or equipment furnished by 
another Government agency, informing the Secretary of 
significant difficulties encountered in this regard. 
(4) Provide adequate safety and health training for officials 
at the different management levels, including supervisory 
employees, employees responsible for conducting occupational 
safety and health inspections, and other employees. Such train­
ing shall include dissemination of information concerning the 
operation of the agency occupational safety and health program 
and the means by which each such person may participate and 
assist in the operation of that program. 
(5) Submit to the Secretary on an annual basis a report 
containing such information as the Secretary shall prescribe. 
(6) Cooperate with and assist the Secretary of Labor in the 
performance of his duties under section 19 of the act and section 
3 of this order. 
(7) Observe the guidelines published by the Secretary 
pursuant to section 3 of this order, giving due consideration to 
the mission, size and organization of the agency. 
Duties of the Secretary of Labor 
 
Scarrying
iaSEC. e. The Secretary shall provide leadership and 
guidance to the heads of agencies to assist them in fulfilling 
their occupational safety and health responsibilities by, among 
other means, taking thefollowingactions: 
(1) Issue detailed guidelines to assist agencies in establish­
ing and operating effective occupafional safety and health 
programs appropriate to their individual missions, sizes, and 
organizations. Such guidelines shall reflect the requiement of 
section 19 of the act for consultation with employee rep­
resentatives. 
(2) Prescribe recordkeeping and reporting requirements to 
enable agencies to assist the Secretary in meeting the 
requirements imposed upon him by section 24 of the act. 
(3) Provide such consultation to agencies as the Secretary deems necessary and appropriate to ensure that agency stand­
ards adopted pursuant to section 2 of this order are consistent 
with the safety and health standards adopted by the Secretary 
pursuant tp section 6 of the act; provide leadership and 
guidance to agencies in the adequate occupational safety and 
health training of agency personnel; and facilitate the exchange 
of ideas and information throughout the Government with 
respect to matters of occupational safety and health through 
such arrangements as the Secretary deems appropriate. 
(4) Perform for agencies, where deemed necessary and 
appropriate, the following services, upon request and 
reimbursement for the expenses thereof: (a),evaluate agency 
working conditions: and recommend to the agency head 
appropriate standards to be adopted pursuant to section 2 of 
this order to ensure that such working conditions are safe and 
healthful; (b) conduct inspections to identify unsafe or 
unhealthful working conditions, and provide assistance to cor­
rect such conditions; (e) train appropriatc agency safety and 
health personnel. 
(5) Evaluate the occupational safety and health programs of 
agencies, and submit to the President reports of such evalua­
tions, together with agency responses thereto. These evalua­
tions shall be conducted at least once annually for agencies em­
ploying more tha 1,000 persons within the geographic locations 
to which the act applies, and as the Secretary deems appro­
priate for all other agencies, through such headquarters or field 
reviews as the Secretary deems necessary. 
(6) Submit to the President each year a summary report of 
the status of the Federal agency occupational safety and health 
program, as well as analyses of individual agency progress and 
problems in correcting unsafe and unhealthful working condi­
tions, together with recommendations for improving their 
performance. 
Federal Advisory Council on Occupational Safety and Health 
SEC. 4. (a) The Federal Advisory Council on Occupational 
Safety and Health, established pursuant to Executive Order 
No. 11612, is hereby continued. It shall advise the Secretary in 
out responsibilities under this order. This Council shall
consist of fifteen members appointed by the Secretaryand shall 
include representatives of Federal agencies and of labor 
organizations representing employees. At least five members 
shall be representatives of such labor organizations. The 
members shall serve for three-year terms with the terms of five 
members expiring each year, provided that this Council is 
renewed every two years in accordance with the Federal 
Advisory Committee dct. The members of the Federal 
Advisory Council on Occupational Safety and Health estab­
lished pursuant to Executive Order No. 11612 shall be deemed 
to be its initial members under this order, and their terms shall 
expire in accordance with the terms of their appointments. 
(b) The Secretary, or a designee, shall serve as the 
Chairman of the Council, and shall prescribe such rules for the 
conduct of its business as he deems necessary and appropriate. 
(c) The Secretary shall make available necessary office 
space and furnish the Council necessary equipment, supplies, 
and staff services, and shall perform such functions with 
respect to the Council as may be required by the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act. 
Effect on Other Powers and Duties 
SEC. 5. Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or 
alter the powers and duties of the Secretary or heads of other 
Federal agencies pursuant to section 19 of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970, sections 7901, 7902, and 7903 of 
title 5 of the United States Code, or any other provision of law, 
nor shall it be construed to alter the provisions of Executive 
Order No. 11491, as amended, Executive Order No. 11636, or 
other provisions of law providing for collective bargaining 
agreements and procedures. Matters of official leave for em­
ployee representatives involved in activities pursuant to this 
order shall be determined between each agency and these 
representatives pursuant to the procedures under Executive 
Order No. 11491, as amended, Executive Order No. 11636, or 
applicable collective bargaining agreements. 
Termination of Existing Order 
SEC. 6. Executive Order No. 11612 of July 26, 1971, is hereby 
superseded. 
The White House 
September 28,1974. 
A' % 
(Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 1:30 pm., September 30, 1974) 
Public Law 91-596 
91st Congress, S. 2193


December 29, 1970 
84 STAT. 1590


To assure safe and healthful uorking conditions for ;'orking men and nomen :
by authorizing enforceminent of the standards 
 develiwd tnider the Act; byassisting and encouraging the States in their efforts to assure safe and health­ful working conditions; by providing for research, information, education, and
training in the field of occupational safety and health; and for other purposes. 
 
* 
Be it enacted by the Senate and louse of Representatives of the
United States of Ameica in Congress nsembled, 'That this Act may
be cited as the "Occupational Safety and Ialtth Act of 1970". Oooupataonaa 
Safety andCOXGRESSION.L FINDINGS AND rURrOSE Health Aot of 
SEc. (2) 1970.The Congress finds that personal injuries and illnesses aris­ing out of work situations impcsO a substantial burden upon, and area hindrance to, interstate commerce in terms of lost production, wageloss, medical expenses, and disability compensation payments.(b) The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy, throughthe exercise of its powers to regulate commerce among the severalStates and with foreign nations and to provide for the general welfare,to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in theNation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve ourhuman resources­(1) by encouraging employers and employees in their efforts
to reduce the number of occupational safety and health hazards

at their places of employment, and to stimulate employers and
employees to institute new and to perfect existing programs forproviding safe and healthful working conditions; 
- (2) by lroviding that employers and employees have separatebut dependent responsibilities and rights with respect to achiev­
ing safe and healthful working conditions;(3) by authorizing the Secretary of Labor to set mandatory
occupational safety and health standards apphlcable to businesses

affecting interstate commerce, and by creating an Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission for carrying out adjudi­

catory functions under the Act;
(4) by building upon advances already made through employer

and employee initiative for providing safe and healthful working

conditions;
(5) by providing for research in the field of occupational

safety and health, including the psychological factors involved,

and by developing innovative methods, 
 techniques, andapproaches for decling with occupational safety and health


problems ;
(6) by exploring ways to discover latent diseases, establishing
causal connections between diseases and work in environmental
conditions, and conducting other research ielating to health prob­lens, in recognition of the fact that occupational health standards

present problems often different from those inxolved in occupa­

tional safety;
(7) by providing medical criteria which will assure insofar aspracticale that no employee will stiffer diminished health, func­tional, capacity, or life expectancyexperience; as a result of his work 
(8) by providing for training programs to increase the num­ber and competence of personnel engaged in the field of occupa­

tional safety and health;


83-081 0 
84 STAT. 1591 Pub. 	Law 91-596 - 2 - December 29, 1970 
( bx) piovid llg for the de eulonent and pronmlgation of0('m I )il'anal safety anld hen It i .standa 1(1s; 
(10) by provi(ding 	 a effective enforcement prograln ullch%hainle a roibtin gans giving advance notice of anlyinspct ion and sarntiots fi any indihxi d a viol ating this pro­
hiton ;(11) by encouragingthe States to assume the fullest responsi­bihty fol the administration and enforcement of their occupa­tional 'afetv and health laws by providing grants to tie Statesto assist in identifying thei, needs and responsibilities in the area
of occupational safety and health, to develop plans in accordance 
with the provisions of this Act, to Implo e tlie administration andenforcement of State occupat ional safety and health laws, and to conduct experimental and demonstration projects in coilec­
tion therewith ; 
(12) by providing for appiopriate repo ting procedures withrespect to occu)ational safe v and health which 	 procedures wvillhel) achieve the objecthies of this Act and accurately describehe nature of the occupational safety and health prol;1em;(13) by encouraging joint labor-management eflorts to reduce 
injuries and disease arising out of employlient. 
DEpINrioxs 
Sx...3. Fm the purposes of this Act­(1) The tet In "Secretary" mean the Secietry of Labor.'(2) The term "Commission" means the Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission established under this Act.(3) The term "conmeice" means trade, tiaffic, commerce, trans­
-portation, or communication amonig the several States, or bet ween 
a State and any place outside theleof, or within the )istrict of 
Columbia, or a possession of the United States (other than theTrust Territory of the Pacific Islands), or between points in the 
same State but through a ponit outside thereof.(4) The tei ln "person' means one or more individuals, partner­
ships. associations, corporations, business trusts, legal representa­
tives, or any organized goup of persons.(5) The term "employer" means a person engaged in abusiness affecting commeace who has employees, but does notinclude the United 	States or any State or political subdivision
of a.State. 
(6) The term "emlplo ye""means an employee of an employer
who is employed in a business of his employer which affects 
commerce. (7) The term "State" includes a State of the United States, theDistrict of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American 
Samoa. Guam, and the Ti ust Teli itory of the Pacific Islands.(8) The term "occupational safety and health standard" 
means a standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or 
use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or proc­
esses. reasonably necessar'y i appiopriate to provide safe or 
healthful employ-ment and places of etplo meat. (9) The tei m "national consensus standard" means any occupa­tional safety and health standard or modification theieof which(1). has been adopted and promulgated by a nationally recog­
nized standards-producing organization under procedures where­by it can be determined by the Secretary that persons interested 
December 29, 1970 ­ 3 - Pub. Law 91-596 B4 STAT. 1592 
and affected by the scope or provisions of the standard have
reached substantial agreement ol its adoption, (2) was forma­
lated in a manner which afforded an oppo tuity for diverse


views to be considered and (3) has been designated as such a


standard by the Seeetarv, after consultation with other appro­

priate Federal agecies.(10) The term "established Federal standard[ means any oper­
ative occupational safety and health standard established by any


agency of the Unitad States and presently in effect, or contained


in any Act of Congress in force on the date of enactment of this


Act.


(11) The term "Committee" means the National Advisoi vCommittee on Occipational Safety and Ilealth established undet


this Act.


(12) The term "Dircctor" means the Director of the National


Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.


(13) The term "Institute" reans the National ]nstitute forOccupational Safetv and Health established undei this Act. (14) The term "Workmen's Compensation Commission" means 
ihe National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation


Laws established umider this Act.


APPENDIX B. CALCULATOR PROGRAMS


Two programs entitled, "Autocorrelation" and Day-Count" were


written and used to process data presented in this report. The 
calculator used was a Texas Instruments SR-52. Listings for these 
programs, which follow, were prepared on Texas Instrument PPX-52 forms. 
The programs can be readily rewritten for'a Hewlett-Packard HP-67 
programmable calculator or for any scientific computer. In the latter 
instance, the programs or major fractions thereof may exist as library 
subroutines.
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Abstract


Program Title A 
- RevAutocorrel ati on 
Description of Program, 
An image of a set of data is formed by autocorrelation. 
-The image, 
which is also a set of data, is, in general, much smoother than the 
original set.- The autocorrelative technique used is both symmetric 
and conservative in effect. 
-
User Benefits: -
The objective of an autocorrelation of a set of data is to ascribe to 
the set, through the means of an image, attributes of a smooth and


* 
 continuous function, e.g., maxima, minima, periodicity.;.-.. .


• 9 RelatedST-439DtCategory Progs­ *- FOg 
*rg.lzS S~es 1 .. Registers__20 
*Program Manual STI, 
 Statistics Library, Texas Instruments Inc., Dallas, Texas


B2­

Program Description 
Program Title Rev.Autocorrelation


Method, Equations, Sketches,Limitations, References* 
The autocorrelation of a function removes its fine structure, usually its


more random qualities. The objective of an autocorrelation is to disclose


some fulidamental characteristics of the function, i.e., maxima or minima or


periodicity. The relative effect of the process is determined by a coef­

ficient, a small coefficient having a small effect and a very large coef­

ficient essentially reducing the function to a constant (the mean value of the


function on the range being considered). An advantage of autocorrelation over


regression, the formal means, commonly used, for removing fine structure, is


that the latter process is constrained to a specific equation or equation set.


Autocorrelation is a rather general term and there are formulations of more


or less sophistication. The following is both symmetric and conservative. In


terms of continuous functions, the autocorrelation of f(x) yields the image,


fxx)dX 
f .x) x * ) .(1) .: 
. '' , " . ,
f j(X)dX 
4*x"
IC-

X=o


.Xj
0 )(t 
1(x) h(X) e c.- ()Q
X- X* 
X* X 
-
h(x) f!f(x-X)e dx, (3) [2 
X=o 
and where, of course, x<x* and a is the coefficient of the autocorrelation.


(Equations (2)and (3)are known as 
 convolution integrals.)>- XCo,,,d on,,fedsheets 
-B 3­
Continuation Sheet 
This program evaluates eq. (3), (2), and (1)numerically using the trap­

ezoidal rule. The program takes a set f,, comprised ot up to 14 data, cor­

.responding to the function f(x), and yields a set f., corresponding to the


image function f(x). the datum points must be located 'on uni;form intervals


of the argument x. In cases where the number of data n exceeds 14, program

STl-14, Histogram Construction, can be used to reduce the number. The units


of the coefficient a relate to the argument interval. If,e.g., a=2 and the


argument interval is 6 mo, a = 2x6 mo = 1 y. The program uses two cards; 

card 1 yields an intermediate set c. which the user must record on a work 

sheet and key-in later when card 2 is in use, (Set c. is a correction vec­

tor which compensates for the coarseness of the integrtion0 ) 
 -
* Figure 1 shows three images, calculated with the program, of a-delta func­

tion located at i=7. Each of these images may be regarded as the density


function for the probability distribution of the location of the delta'func­

tion on the argument i. Thus, when a=l, an event, represented by the delta


function, could have occurred at i=9 rather than at i=7, the odds being


0.076 0.346 or about 1 out of 5.


.- 84


1 2 3 4 6' 7 8 9 10 1Oll 1-2 13, 
' '-nterval ~~~ ii"' ~~i index ,.,.,,,' 
I-F Autocorrelation Images of a Delta Function " ,,, ,


B4-'


Continuation Sheet


Figure 2 shows two images, calculated with the program,of a step function.


The image of the step fufictTon is comprised of the sum of the images of del­

ta functions, one located on each of the intervals, i=1,6. These image

functions are conservative, viz 0 , their integrals are equal' to the integral

of the original function, ie., 6. Taking the probablistic view, for the
given coefficients a, the respective images are analytically defensible den­

sity functions for the occurrence of six events.


- Robert Magladry 
1.0


0


0 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
i - interval index 
Fig. 2 Autocorrelation Images of a Step Function


Reference: W. Jay Merrill, Jr. and Corwin A. Bennett, The Application of


Temporal Correlation Techniques inPsychology, "Journal of,

Applied Psychology", Vol. 40, No0 4, 1956


-B 5-_


Sample Problem


Statement of Example 
The average number of days lost from work per employee injury at a space
flight center has been determined for Il.consecutive 6-mo intervals. These
data comprise the following set. The index i to members of the,,set, ofcourse,

takes values 1 through 11.


fi: 16.4, 24.3, 15.8, 14.2, 20.8, 58.2, 67.i, 4.0, 14.3, 41.0, 9.3.


Using an autocorrelation coefficient of Iy, calculate the autocorrelation j
image set, 1' l 
 EContinued on attached sheets 
ENTER PRESS 
 DISPLAY 
 COMMENT


Load sides A and B of card 1. 
•n=ll 
 A


2B 
 y 6 mo
i 1,11 C ci


c1 : 2.479, 3.121, 
 .497, 3.701, 3.786, 3.773, 3.65, 3.417, ?.982, 2.244, 1.016.


D 
 = 1 Initializefi 
 E i +I


Load side A of carc 2.


A 
 i = 1 Continue 
ci C + I 
D I Continuei = 1,11 E fi


fi: 20.1, 20.8, 21.7, 23.9, 28.3, 33.0, 33Ji, 28.5, 25.8, 25.6, 24.4. 
,COver


-B 6


X 
Sample Problem (cont'd)


ENTER PRESS DISPLAY COMMENT 
The value of a used in the foregoirg example was deterined by trial and 
error. It is the lowest whole-number value which did not produce a 6-mo 
ripple inthe autcorrelation image. 
: ' 
7 
6 l y 
I 3 
42 
Fig. 3 
2 3 4 5 6 7 '8 9 10 11 
i - 6-m( interval index 
Zaw Data and Autocor elation Image of Fovegoing Example 
13,7­

Program Title Autocorrelation 
STEP 
1 

2 

3 

00 
4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

.9 

'10 

11 

12 

Card -,USER DEFINED KEYS 
A n 
I 
I 
A 
Card 2 
Continue 
User Instructions Initialize fContinue 
PROCEDURE ENTER PRESS DISPLAY REGISTERS 
fNote: Program will 
t 
handle n514. 
ohi, m, n, 
01Cl, f 
j 
11 
Load sides A and B of card 1. 
Enter number of data. 
Enter coefficient. 
(When n = 14, running time to 
step 4 is approx 3.6 m) 
Do step 4, i =1, n; 
record c. on work sheet. 
Display Icorrection set. 
Initialize. 
Do step 6, i = 1, n. 
Enter data set. 
Load side A of card 2. 
Continue program. 
(When n = 14, running time to 
step 9 is approx 3.6 m) 
Do step 9, i = 1, n 
Enter correction set from work 
sheet. 
'Continue program. 
Do step 11, i = l,"n.
Display autocorrelated data. 
n 
i 
fi 
-
ci 
i 
. 
. 
A 
B 
c 
D 
A 
C 
D ,-
E 
.. 
.L 
0 
1. 
-06 
ci 
i=l 
i+l 
0 
i= 
i+l 
02 
04 
) 
C, 
0 
0 
- I -
2 
2 
3 
FLAGS 
12 
LABELS 
cl 1NVD 
C.l) DENST 
121 
13 
14 c14 f14 
is Sum fi16 
a77 f 
m 
i, b 
9 n 
" 
S 
8 
3 4 
L[T0J 0 U,,MD '3Mr Ix 
- LjWRDN Ea fli[MX31 " 
-
To run another data set, load 
side A of card 1 and go to 
step 2 or 5. 
. 
______D 
0 
DC, 
5-3n 
1 
F.. q, C..7_ ['Mi 3IsD 
,]M[' 
-
M r 
-LB @ C E=L:, t .­ 7] 
(7)ITarlE] ~ to AfELs72 
E+2______::iW~/'M2finQ irii 
n 
E 
Listing - Card 1

LOC CODE 	 KEY COMMENTS LOC CODE KEY COMMENTS LOG CODE KEY COMMENTS 
000 16 11 
 LBL A input unimation ubroutine 
 150 36 42 01 08 *IND STD 18002 12 01 09 TO 	 19 072 6 87 LBL *1 
 43 01- 154 08 RCL 18 1+1005 12 0000' 	 TO00 	 074 301 09 CL 19 n 157 75 01 95 - 1 = m-i008 )1 	 077 2 00 00 TO 00 160 90 01 07 01 *IF 0 171 m-exit009 36 42 00 00 IND STO 00 080 6 43 00 00 'IND RCL 00 9i 164 42 00 00 STO 00013 -80000 08 
 DSZ' 008, 	 084 5 167 41 01 0000 GTO 100 m-retur017 1 LT " 085 8 00 08 00 DSZ 080. • " 089 )095 : N ' um 9i' 171 56 *RTN•


018 6 12 ' LBL B ' input 091 6 RTN 
 1 Se
020 4 /-
-a Reversal Subroutine
021 2 01 06 TO 	16 'onvolution 
 ubroutine 
 172 
 46 89 *LBL *3
024 1 88 BR *2 onvolute 092 6 88 LBL *2 174 01 42 01 08 1 TO 18
026 1 89 BR *3 everse 094 3 01 09 CL 19 
 n 178 43 01 09 RCL 19028 1 88 BR 	*2 
-
onvolute 097 2 00 00 TO 00 initial m 181 42 0000 STO 00 n
030 1 89 BR 	 *3 everse032 1 LT 	 100 1 "-loop 184 36 43 0000 *IND RCL 00 loop
101 2 01 08 TO 18 Initial i 188 36 48 01 08 *IND *EXC 1033 613 LBL C input 104 6 43 0000 IND RCL 00 9 192 36 42 00 00 *IND STO 00035 2 0000 TO 	 O0 108 5 93 05 95 .5 = 	 196 43 01 08 RCL 18038 6 43 00 00 IND RCL 00 i 12 2 01 07 TD 17 f 199 65 02 95 x 2 =042 31 LT lisplay 
 202 75 43 01 09- RCL 19 
115 2 NV -loop 206 95043 6 14 LBL I initializ 116 58 01 04 07 DSZ 147 '-exit 207 80 02 02 03 *IF POS 223 exit
045 1 42 00 00 STO 00 i=1 120 3 Ol 08 iCL 18 i 211 Ol 1
049 1 - - LT isplay 123 ;5 212 22 44 00 00 INV SUM 00 
124 13 01 06 95 $CL 16 = -ila 216 44 01 08 SUM 18050 6 15 LBL E • input 128 2 23 [NV in x 	 219 41 01 08 04 GTO 184 return
052 6 42 00 00 IND STO 00 	 
'130 5 ­056 1 44 000 0 SUM 00 6 430 0 
-i131 IND RCL 00 , 223 56 *RTN
060 3 000 -CL 0 . i+1 135 5'. m 
063 1 ' ILT - - isplay 136 .401 07 -UM,7 17 " 
 
-
-'139 1 44 01 08 SUM ' "i+l064 
 
- ': 143 1 01 01 05 TO 115 -return 
thru blank 
071 
­ ' . 147 3 01 07 CL 17 
%Contiaued shnthaa aflached 
Listing - Card 2


LOC 
000 
002 
004 
-007 
009 

011 
013 

015 
019 

020 

022 
024 

027 
031 

034 

035 

037 

039 

040 
044 

047 
048 

050 
053 
057 
050 

062 
063 
thru 

071 

CODE KEY COMMENTS LOG CODE KEY COMMENTS LOC CODE KEY COMMENTS 
46 
51 
42 
51 
11 
87 
0 
88 
05 
*LBL A 
SBR *1 
STO 15 
SBR *2 
Continue 
Sum 
Convolut 
072 
thru 
ill 
same 
as 
Card I 
51 
51 
89 
88 
SBR *3 
SBR *2 
Reverse 
Convolut 
112 
thru blank 
51-89 
01 42 
81 
00 00 
SBR *3 
1 STO 00 
HLT 
Reverse 
i = I 
display 
223 
6 13 
6 22 
*LBL C 
*IND INV 
c. input 7' 
9 00 00 *PROD 00 
01 44 00 00 1 SUM OO 
3 0000 RCL O0 i +I 
81 HLT display 
6 14 *LBL D continue 
1 87 - SBR *1 Sum 
5 
3 01 05 95 RCL 15 = b 
2 01 08 STO 18 
1 - HLT 
6 15 
2 0000 
*LBL E 
STO O0 
iinput 
6 43 
5 
00 00 *IND RCL 0( 
3 01 08 95 RCL 18 f 
1 HLT. 
-isplay 
blank 
-
Abstract.


Program Title Rev 
Day-Count

Description of Program


The number of days which have (or will 
 have) transpired between two calendar
dates is determined, also the number of those days which were used (or will
be used) according to a specified weekly schedule. 
 "


j , - - s J-l 
-
User Benefits: 
Because the rate the Earth revolves around the Sun does not divide evenly

and conveniently into the rate the Earth rotates on 
 its axis, given two dates
itmay be a chore to determine the exact number of days between them.-,'
Number of days is,of course, a common measure of many things, e.g.,.

biological processes, production machine li.fe.


Category 29 Related Prog 386 -; Data 
Progs. 
-- Steps-.. Registers 19 
-BI1 ­
Program Description


Program Title Rev. 
Day-Count


Method. Equations,Sketches, Lrmjtations,References


This program is applicable to situations where relatively'long time
periods are defined by initial and final dates and also where those time


periods are further reduced by specified weekly schedules.


The program was originally used in the development of some work injury

-statistics. An employee may be injured on 
 one date and may return to work
on another. The number of days between the two dates is 
 a measure of the

seriousness of the injury. Ifthe employee's pay is continued during his
absence, the number of work days which he misses is
a measure of the loss
to his employer. To determine the latter number, 
 the program must also­
carry his weekly work schedule. 
 The program does not account for holidays,
but if the holiday schedule is known, identifying and subtracting missed


holidays, after the calculation, is easy to do. 
 
.The program is recorded on two cards. 
-

Card I is-used to calculate the
total number of days between an initial date and a later date:


Card 1 (mo1/d1/y ,
1 mo2/d2/y2) = d, -.­
where the subscript 1 refers to the initial date and the subscript 2 refers
to the later date. 
 If the two dates are both in the same century, each year

may be represented by its last two digits. 
 Card 2 is used to calculate the
number of days, between corresponding dates, 
 where the total number is'­

reduced by a-weekly schedule:


- , , Card 2 (14, dt$ ds) = d , 4-­

where W is the weekly schedule, 
 dt is the total number of days between an


initial date and a final date, and ds is the total number of days between,the


initial date and the date of any Sunday occurring after the final date.


Card 1 
 can be used to calculate both dt and ds. A nominal-.weekly schedule


which simply excludes Saturday and Sunday-is a part of the card 2 routine.
Alternatively; the program user may specify a weekly schedule-, 
 Specified


X Coltiued on attached sheets 
-B 12­

Continuation Sheet


schedules-can.be comprised of fractional days.


There are no clever algorithms used on either card. The calculational

procedures are essentially those one would use if working with a 
 perpetual

calendar. 
 Card I uses a list of the number of days in respective,months in
registers R01 , R1I. Card 2 uses 
 a twelve-day sequence, corresponding to


respective days of the week, in registers RI

, R2." For the nominal


schedule, this sequence is comprised of Is and Os. 
 The number of days to a


Sunday, ds, 
is used within the program to locate the summing process


- relative to the sequence.

Both cards are based on the following convention: The day corre­

sponding to the initial date is not counted or considered for counting; the
day corresponding to the later date is counted and is considered for count­
ing according to the weekly schedule.


- Robert Magladry 
-B 13 ­
Sample Problem 
Statement of Example 
On 9/10/73, 
 two employees at a tracking station, transporting electronic gear,
were injured when wind blew the vehicle, which they were using, off the road.
Their respective recovery periods 	 ended 1.0/3/73 and 2/27/74. 
 How-many days
did each employee take to recover? Disregarding holidays, how many work days
did each employee miss? Both employees had nominal weekly work schedules0.
The date of a Sunday is 11/14/76.


Continued on attached sheets 
ENTER 
 PRESS 
 DISPLAY COMMENT


Load both sides of card 1.


moI = 9 
	 ST0 14 date of injury

dI = 10 STO 15


Yl = 73 .ST0 16


:mo2 = 
 11 	 STO 17 
 date of a Sunday


d = 14 
 STO 18


Y2' = 
 76 	 STO 19


E ds 1161 days to Sunday

mo2 = 10 STO 17

d2 = 4 STO 18


Y2 73, ST0 19


E dt =23 recovery days,


mo2 2 	 17 
.ST0 	 one employee


*d2 = 28 	 STO 18


Y2 = 74 	 STO19


- E dt-= 169 	 recovery days,


other employee


)<Over 
-B 14­
Sample Problem (cont'd) 
ENTER 	 PRESS DISPLAY COMMENT 
Load both sides of card 2. 

D nominal schedule 
dt = 24 A 
ds = 1161 B dw = 17 missed work days, 
dt = 171 *A one employee 

1161 
 
w 121 	 missed work days,


other employee


- B 15.­
Program Title Day-Count


USER DEFINED KEYS 
A Enter total days A 
Enter days to Sun 8 
I :and run 'card 2| 1 ,.," 
User stuctions 0Enter nom. schedule DaERun card I cr 
STEP PROCEDURE ENTER PRESS DISPLAY REGISTERS 
1 
2 
Load both sides of card 1. 
Enter initial date. mo 
d 
STO 1I 
STO 15 
-card] 
Jan 
02 Feb 
card .2 
W 
Th ;2 
Oct 
Nov 
ylcY<y 2 
F 
S 
S 
3 Enter later date. Y no 
d2 
STO 16 
STO 17 
STO 18 
03 Mar 
o Apr 
F 
S 
13d 
14 
a,b
a,b 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Run program. 
To rerun, enter changes; go to 
step 4,. 
Load both sides of card 20 o 
step 7 if weekly schedule is not 
nominal, Otherwise skip step 7. 
Enter weekly schedule. Each 
entry is the decimal fraction, 
i.e., 0 to 1, of a day to be 
counted for corresponding day of 
week. Note, the repeated days of 
the week require repeated 
entries. Go to step 9. 
entries.W GSTO 
Y2 
2 
W 
Th 
F 
S 
S 
M 
T 
T.h 
STO 19 
E 
STO 01 
STO 02 
STO 03 
STO 04 
STO 05 
STO 06 
.STO 07 
08 
ST0 09 
d dt'd s 
05 May
11 June 
0 July 
Aug 
09 Sept 
399 
I 
2 
3 
4 
4LAGS 
FLAGS 
10 
LABELS 
S 1S dl
M 6Yl 
T Mo 
W tad2 
Th ds2y 2 
7 
-n ot leap year 
. 
d 
iT 
f 
d 
w 
1 
S STO I -ITr"-;10-2'r_-I 
- L - M MX 
8 
9 
-10 
11 
Selectndminal weekly schedule. 
Enter total days. 
Enter days to a Sunday. 
To rerun, enter weekly schedule 
c h a n g e s , if a n y . Go t o s t e p 9. 
S 
dt 
d 
s 
.. 
- STO 12 
D . 
AJ 
B 
_ _ _ _ _ 
_ 
[c d 
[:5CE D Rfl0= 
ri j 
JE CL29=r 
C-Eb ZF@i .-­
w:-1 .', 
D0 
M 
-= i­r 
M E 
D 'I 
i" -.M E3 
- D 
r 
4 
X3 
= 
(1_ 
1 
M 
F'E3 
m. 
Listing - Card 1 
LOC CODE KEY COMMENTS LOC CODE KEY COMMENTS LOC CODE KEY COMMENTS 
000 46 15 - *LBL E run card 106 01 44 01 03 1 SUM 13 
- Days in Yea Subroutine 
002005 
007 
007 
009 
012 
014018 
43 01 09 RCL 1951 87 SBR *1 
51 87 SBR *2 
435188 R *2 
43 0 07 RCL 17 
51 89 SBR *343 01 08 95 RCL 1842 0103 STO 13 
.. 
y
eap 2 
ays MD 
y 
ays Yrd12 
110 
114 
117 
118 
thru 
123 
41 00 07 04 GTO 074 
43 01 03 RCL 13 
81 HLT 
blank 
-­
018p 42ar 01.0 STO 13 
y-return204204Y(i46 8989*B,*
d 206 42 00 00 
209 22 58 
211 02 02 03 
214 36 43 0000 
218 85 
219 41 02 00 09 
223 56 
*LBL *3 
STO 00 
INV *DSZ 
223 
*IND RCL 0 
+ 
GTO 209 
*RTN 
mo 
loop 
exit 
loop rtn 
021 
024 
026 
028 
031 
033 
43 01 06 RCL 16 
51 87 SBR *1 
51 88 SR *2 
43 01 04 RCL 14 
51 89., SBR *3 
43 01 05 95 RCL 15 
.eap Flg 
Days Mo 
m 
Days Yr 
d1 
124 
126 
129 
132 
135 
Leap Year F eg Subrouti 
46 87 *LBL *1 
55 04 95 4 4 = 
42 00 00 STO 00 
57 00 52 *FIX 0 EE 
22 57 75 INV *FIX -
e 
y 
037 22 44 01 03 INV SUM 13 d 138 43 00 00 95 RCL 00 = 
041 
045 
049 
050 
053 
43 01 09 75 RCL 19­
43 01 06 95 RCL 16 = 
90 *IF 0 
00 06 08 068 
03 06 05 365 
y2-y 
ame yr 
exit 
142 
144 
148 
150 
154 
157 
22 52 INV EE 
90 01 05 04 *IF 0 154 leap yr 
50 01 *ST FLG 1 e 
41 01 05 07 GTO 157 exit 
22 50 01 INV *ST FL,1 
56 *RTN 
055 44 01 03 SUM 13 
059 
061 
064 
60 01 
000608 
01 44 01 
*IF FLG 1 
068 
03 1 SUM 13 
iot leap 
exit 
d 
158 
160 
Days inMonth Subroutin 
46 88 *LBL *2 
01 01 42 11 STO 
068 430106 RCL 16 163 0000 03 01 00 31 loop 
071 42 01 02 STO 12 Yl 167 36 42 00 00 *IND STO O0 
074 01 75 01 02 1 SUM 12 
07843 0O 02 I 1P78 43 02 . RCL12 
081 51 87 SBR *1083 43 01 02 75 RtL 12­083 43010276 RCL 12­
087 43 09 95RCL 19091 80 !*IF+-,-
Y­y -
Leap Fig 
YY2 
171 
175 
180 
183 
.186 
58 01 06 05 
01 94 04 
44 00 06 
44 00 09 
44 01 01 
*DSZ 165 
1+/-SUM 04 
SUM 06 
SUM 09 
SUM 11 
loop rtn 
Apr 
June 
Sept 
Nov 
... 
092 01 01 04 114 exit 189 03 94 3 +/­
095 03 06 05 365 191 44 00 02 SUM 02 Feb 
098 44 01 03 SUM 13 194 60 01 " *IF FLG 1 
101 
103 
60 1 *IF FLG 
'1110 
not leap 
196 
199 
203 
02 00 03 203 
0l 44 00 02 1 SUM 02 
56 *RTN 
exit,
Feb 
n101a  
Listing 
- Card 2 
LOG CODE KEY COMMENT LOC CODE KEY COMMENT LOC CODE KEY COMMENT 
000 
002 
004 
46 14 
51 78 
81 
*LBL D 
SBR *6 
HLT 
Nominal 
096 
099 
103 
01 01 00 110 
36 43 00 00 *IND RCL 00 
44 01 08 SUM 18 
exit 
005 
007 
46 11 
42 01 05 
*LBL A 
STO 151 
d 
106 58 00 08 07 *DSZ 087 
110 43 01 08 RCL 18 
113 81 HLT 
loop rtn 
010 94 85 - +­ + 
012 81 .' HLT 114 
013 46 12 *LBL B ds 
thru blank 
169 
0155 95 
016 55 07 95 
019 51 77 
021 43 01 04 
024 65 07 95 94 
028 85 01 02 95 
032 42 01 06 
7= 
SBR *4 
RCL 14 
x7= +/­
+12= 
STO 15 
s 
SadT 
Remainde 170 
172 
175 
179 
182 
Remainder Sibroutine 
46 77 *LBL *4 
42 01 04 STO 14 
75 93 05 95 -.5= 
57 00 52 *FIX 0 EE 
42 01 03 STO 13 
035 
038 
041 
43 01 05 
55 07 95 
51 77 
RCL 15 
7= 
SBR *4 
dT 
b 
Remainde 
185 
189 
191 
193 
22 44 01 
22 57 
22 52 
56 
04 INV SUM 14
INV *FIX 
INV EE 
*RTN 
043 43 01 04 RCL 14 
046 
050 
65 07 95 94 
85 43 01 06 
x7= +/­
+ RCL 16 Nominal Sch chle Subrou me 
054 
055 
95 - , 
42 Ol 07 STO 17 
194 
196 
46 78 
01 00 
*LBL *5 
10 
058 
062 
06667 
07 42 0000 
35 43 00 00 
8558 00 06 02 
7 STOO 
*IND RCL 0 
+ *DSZ062 
198 42 00 00 STO 00 
201 01 1 loop
202 36 42 00 00 *IND STO 00 
205 58 02 00l *DSZ 201 loop rtn 
210 00 0 
071 
073 
077 
00 95. 
65 43 01 03 
95 42 01 08 
= 
x RCL 13 
= STO 18 
-
d 
d 
211 
214 
217 
42 01 02 
42 01 01 
42 00 05 
STO 12, 
STO'll 
STO 05 
w 220 42 00 04 STO 04 
081 43 01 06 . RCL 16 223 56 *RTN 
084 42 0000 
087 43 01 07 75 
091 43 00 00 95 
STO 00 
RCL 17 
RCL 0= 
, 
-loop 
095 80 - *IF+ 
